Chapter
Multidisciplinary Nature of Conflict Economics
1.4. Organization of Book
2 Production Possibilities and the Guns versus Butter Trade-Off
2.1. Production Possibilities Model
Production Possibilities Frontier
Specialization and Trade in the Production Possibilities Model
Economic Growth in the Production Possibilities Model
Economic Costs of Conflict
Defense Spending and Economic Growth
3 Rational Choice and Equilibrium
3.1. Rational Choice Model
Substitution and Income Effects
Arms and the Fungibility of Foreign Aid
Land Mines and the Substitution Principle
3.2. Supply, Demand, and Market Equilibrium
Comparative-Static Analysis
Difficulty of Small Arms Control
4 Fundamentals of Game Theory
Extensive and Normal Forms
Solutions and Equilibriums
4.2. Chicken and Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
4.3. Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
5 A Bargaining Model of Conflict
5.1. Elements of Conflict
5.2. Sources of Violent Conflict
Inconsistent Expectations
5.3. Third-Party Intervention
6 Conflict between States
6.2. Patterns of Armed Interstate Conflict
Measures of Interstate Conflict
6.3. Hirshleifer’s Bargaining Model and Interstate War
6.4. Selected Empirical Studies of Interstate Conflict
Risk Factors for Interstate Armed Conflict
Economic Costs of World War I
7.2. Patterns of Armed Civil Conflict and Genocide
Measures of Armed Civil Conflicts
Genocides and Politicides
7.3. Theoretical Perspectives on Civil War
Motives and Conditions for Civil Strife
Greed and Grievance Motives
Opportunistic Rebel Leaders and the Business of Rebellion
A Net Revenue Model of Rebellion
Economically Viable Rebellion
Changes in Revenues and Costs of Rebellion
7.4. Selected Empirical Studies of Civil War and Genocide
Risk Factors for Civil War and Genocide
Greed, Grievance, and Weak States
Civil War and Economic Growth
8.2. Patterns of Terrorism
8.3. A Rational Choice Model of Terrorism
Terrorist Access to Income
Terrorist Response to Price Changes
Terrorist Substitution Possibilities
8.4. Game Theoretic Perspectives of Terrorism
Hostage Game between a Government and Terrorists
Counterterrorism Games between Governments
8.5. Selected Empirical Studies of Terrorism
Risk Factors for Terrorism
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Terrorism and Economic Growth
9 Geography and Technology of Conflict
9.1. Boulding’s Model of Spatial Conflict
Defensive and Offensive Military Innovations
Buffer Zones and Peacekeeping Forces
9.2. O’Sullivan’s Three-Dimensional Model of Spatial Conflict
Pyramid Model of the Distribution of Military Power
9.3. Schelling’s Inherent Propensity toward Peace or War
Basic Lanchester Model of War Attrition
Lanchester Attack/Defend Model
9.4. Number and Size of Nations
The Alesina-Spolaore Model
Comparative-Static Analysis
Risk of International Conflict
Openness and Economic Integration
Information Technologies and the Emergence of Trans-State Groups
9.5. Selected Empirical Studies
Determinants of Secession
Offense-Defense Theory and Evidence
10 Arms Rivalry, Proliferation, and Arms Control
10.2. Patterns of Arms Rivalry, Proliferation, and Arms Control
10.3. The Richardson Arms Race Model
Richardson’s Differential Equations
Reaction Functions and Equilibrium
10.4. The Intriligator-Brito Model
Deterrence and Attack Conditions
Iranian Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Antiballistic Missile Technology in Europe
Inherent Propensity toward War in the I-B Model
10.5. An Economic Choice Model of Arms Rivalry
Optimal Allocation of Resources to Military and Civilian Goods
Reaction Functions and Arms Rivalry Equilibrium
Economic Strength and Arms Rivalry Competitiveness
10.6. Selected Empirical Studies
Structure of Arms Rivalries
Arms Rivalry and the Risk of War
Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
10.7. Bibliographic Notes
11.2. Patterns of Interstate Alliances
11.3. Pure Public Good Model of Alliances
Public Goods and Alliances
Reaction Functions and Alliance Equilibrium
Disproportionate Burden Sharing
11.4. Joint Product Model of Alliances
Pure Public, Impure Public, and Private Goods
Technology of Public Supply and the Joint Product Model
11.5. Selected Empirical Studies
Burden Sharing within NATO
Alliances and the Risk of Armed Conflict
11.6. Bibliographic Notes
12 Conflict Success Functions and the Theory of Appropriation Possibilities
12.1. Conflict Success Functions
12.2. A Model of Appropriation Possibilities
Basic Model of Resource Conflict
Reaction Functions and Equilibrium
Paradox of Power and the Irrelevance of Initial Resource Holdings
Settlement Opportunities in the Resource Conflict Model
12.3. Appropriation Possibilities in a Production/Exchange Economy
Specialized Production and Trade under Secure Property
Production Possibilities and Autarky Equilibrium
Insecure Resources and Dissipation of the Production/Exchange Economy
Appropriation Possibilities and Equilibrium in a Production/Exchange Economy
A Predator/Prey Model of Appropriation, Production, and Exchange
12.4. Bibliographic Notes
APPENDIX A Statistical Methods
A.1. Populations and Samples
A.2. Probability and Sampling
A.3. Expected Values and Unbiased Estimators
A.4. Statistical Inference
APPENDIX B A More Formal Bargaining Model of Conflict
B.1. Basic Model of Resource Conflict
Net Resource Functions under Fighting
Reaction Functions and Fighting Equilibrium
Net Resource Functions under Settlement
Reaction Functions and Settlement Equilibrium
B.2. Selected Sources of Violence
Inconsistent Expectations
Principles of Conflict Economics
：A Primer for Social Scientists
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