Chapter
5. Transition to positive law
5.1 The moment of distribution
5.2 The distributing actors
6. Structure of the volume
2 Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Normative-Philosophical Analysis
2. Personal responsibility: causality and agency
2.1 Responsibility and causality
2.2 Responsibility and agency
2.3 Individual agency and personal responsibility: a conclusion
3. Collective responsibility
3.1 From personal to collective responsibility
3.2 Ascribing collective responsibility through the agency model
3.3 Deontological and consequentialist defences of collective responsibility
3.4 Collective responsibility and agency: a conclusion
4. From philosophical to legal arguments
5. Collective responsibility in international law
5.1 The variety of actors involved in shared international responsibility
5.2 Consequentialist defences and outcome responsibility
5.3 The distinction between private law and public law approaches
5.4 A conceptual problem or a problem of implementation?
3 Shared Political Responsibility
3. Responsibility in international law
4. Climate change, responsibility, and politics
4.1 Liberal individuals and climate change
4.2 Responding to international legal responsibility
4.3 Radical responsibility
4 Ex Ante and Ex Post Allocation of International Legal Responsibility
1. Introduction: shared responsibility and national measures
1.1 Requirements regarding substance: state contingency
1.2 Specific rules and general standards regarding substance
1.3 Requirements regarding process: procedure contingency
1.4 Interaction between state contingency, rules and standards, and procedure contingency
1.5 Structure of the chapter
2. The use in international law of state contingency, rules, standards, and procedure contingency
2.1 ‘Necessity’ analysis: Brazil-Tyres
2.2 SPS requirements of scientific basis: EU-Hormones
2.3 Fair and equitable treatment under international investment law: Metalclad v. Mexico
2.4 Complementarity in the ICC
2.5 Proportionality in the law of armed conflict
3.1 International law and policy externalities: the value of taking into account the concerns of other states
3.2 Incomplete contracts and state contingency
3.3 State contingency: rules and standards
3.4 Procedure contingency: judicial review
3.5 Procedure contingency: burdens of proof
3.6 Procedure contingency: information and expertise asymmetry
5 Incentives, Compensation, and Irreparable Harm
2. Economic analysis of joint and several liability
2.1 The (second) simplest tort
2.3 Joint and several liability
3. Responsibility of international organisations
3.1 The law governing liability of international organisations
3.2 Incentives and accountability in international organisations
6 Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Political Economy Analysis
2. Goals of the responsibility regime
3. State responsibility de lege lata
3.1 Independent responsibility
3.2 Proportional responsibility
3.3 Joint and several liability
4. What games do states play?
4.1 Prisoners’ dilemma constellations
4.1.2 Independent responsibility
4.1.3 Proportional responsibility
4.1.4 Joint and several responsibility
4.2 Trust game constellations
4.2.2 Independent responsibility
4.2.3 Proportional responsibility
4.2.4 Joint and several responsibility
4.3 Summary of the findings on cooperation of states
5. The trade-off problem from a political economy perspective
5.1 Trade-off between the different goals of state responsibility
5.2 Institutional suggestions
7 Public Power and Preventive Responsibility: Attributing the Wrongs of International Joint Ventures
2. Why JPEs? Why attribution? Why wrongdoing?
4. Vigilant prevention of wrongdoing in international law
5. Due diligence, attribution, and drawing lines of responsibility
6. Attribution and lawful joint public enterprises
7. Addressing the limits of the preventive control framework
8 ‘Coalitions of the Willing’ and the Shared Responsibility to Protect
2. A model of institutional moral agency
3. Coalitions of the willing as a ‘hard case’
3.1 Defining ‘coalitions of the willing’
3.2 Are coalitions of the willing institutional moral agents?
4. A gap in the analysis? Moral responsibilities and informal associations
4.1 Held’s ‘random collection’
4.2 May’s ‘middle position’
5. The moral significance of acting in concert: coalitions of the willing and responsibilities to protect
5.1 Joint purposive action, enhanced capacities, and redefined individual responsibilities to protect
5.2 Distributing responsibilities and apportioning blame amongst relevant agents
5.3 Accompanying (on-going and long-term) responsibilities
9 Distributing the Responsibility to Protect
2. The unfulfilled promise of collective duties
2.1 Assigning R2P to all outside states simultaneously
2.2 Assigning R2P to international organisations
3. The potential of individual duties
3.1 Theoretical foundations
3.1.1 The seeds for crafting R2P duties
3.1.2 The seeds for grounding R2P responsibilities
3.2 Preliminary remarks on the R2P bundle
3.2.3 Duty not to obstruct
10 The Problem of Shared Irresponsibility in International Climate Law
2. Climate change as a collective-action problem
3. The nature of the climate change game
4. Can liability motivate shared responsibility for climate change mitigation?
4.1 The notion of ‘state responsibility’ in international law
4.1.1 Potential liability under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol
4.1.2 Potential liability under the customary ‘no-harm’ rule
5. Polycentric approaches to climate change: of ‘regime complexes’, ‘building blocks’, ‘bottom-up approaches’ and ‘tipping sets’
11 Transboundary Damage in Climate Change Criteria for Allocating Responsibility
1. Introduction: damage and excess
2. Cumulative carbon: the science
3. Cumulative carbon: the significance
4. Profligate emissions: four allocation principles
5. The US case: causal and moral responsibility for profligacy
6. The US case: legal responsibility
12 Shared Responsibility for Climate Change: From Guilt to Taxes
3. What is responsibility: individual and collective?
4. The ethics of climate change responsibility: individual versus collective perspectives
5. Collective guilt and collective responses
13 How to Keep Promises: Making Sense of the Duty Among Multiple States to Fulfil Socio-Economic Rights in the World
2. Bases for assigning obligations of international assistance and cooperation
2.1 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Committee
2.2 Causation as a basis for assigning obligations of international cooperation
2.3 Historical responsibility as a basis for assigning obligations of international cooperation
2.4 Capacity as a basis for assigning obligations of international cooperation
2.5 Capacity and the matter of cost
14 Pirate ‘Gaolbalisation’: Dividing Responsibility Among States, Companies, and Criminals
2. Ex ante responsibility - suppression and deterrence
2.2 Private vs. public action
3. Ex post responsibility: division of labour and specialisation
4. Liability for downstream violations
5. Extensions: market-based allocation of responsibility
15 The Global Financial Crisis and Collective Moral Responsibility
1. Introduction: the problem(s)
2. Collective moral responsibility
2.1 Collective responsibility as joint responsibility
2.3 Organisational action as joint action
3. Collective action problems
3.2 Collective action problems in the global banking sector
3.3 Collective action problems and collective moral responsibility
4. Institutionally embedding collective moral responsibility in the global banking sector
4.1 Institutionally embedding collective moral responsibility
Distribution of Responsibilities in International Law
( Shared Responsibility in International Law )
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