Global Shell Games :Experiments in Transnational Relations, Crime, and Terrorism ( Cambridge Studies in International Relations )

Publication subTitle :Experiments in Transnational Relations, Crime, and Terrorism

Publication series :Cambridge Studies in International Relations

Author: Michael G. Findley; Daniel L. Nielson; J. C. Sharman  

Publisher: Cambridge University Press‎

Publication year: 2014

E-ISBN: 9781107723290

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9781107043145

Subject: D815.5 international security issues, international terrorism, counter - narcotics activities in the

Keyword: 外交、国际关系

Language: ENG

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Global Shell Games

Description

Every year a staggering number of unidentified shell corporations succeed in hiding perpetrators of terrorist financing, corruption and illegal arms trades, but the degree to which firms flout global identification standards remains unknown. Adopting a unique, experimental methodology, Global Shell Games attempts to unveil the sordid world of anonymous shell corporations. Posing as twenty-one different international consultants, the authors approached nearly 4,000 services in over 180 countries to discover just how easy it is to form an untraceable company. Combining rigorous quantitative analysis, qualitative investigation of responses and lurid news reports, this book makes a significant research contribution to compliance with international law and international crime and terrorism whilst offering a novel, new approach to the field of political science research. Global Shell Games is an invaluable resource for scholars of international relations, and a fascinating, accessible read for anyone interested in learning about worldwide criminal practice in corporate finance.

Chapter

Transnational relations

Field experiments

Plan of the book

2 Explaining the global shell game

Shell companies

Corporate service providers and the shell company industry

The global corporate transparency standards

Experimental design

Coding responses

Conclusion

3 Overall compliance, tax havens, OECD and developing countries

Overall results

Comparing aggregate results with expectations

Compliance by country type: the rich, the poor, and the havens

The results: confounding the conventional wisdom

Explaining the results

Conclusion

4 Terrorism and corruption

Explaining the Terrorism treatment

Terrorism findings

Explaining the Corruption treatment

Corruption findings

Explaining the Premium treatment

Findings for the Premium condition

Conclusion

5 Laws and standards

Private authority, non-state actors, and transnational relations

Knowledge, rules, and compliance

Explaining the FATF treatment

FATF findings

ACAMS treatment

ACAMS findings

IRS treatment

IRS findings

Conclusion

6 Penalties, norms, and US origin

Penalties treatment

Penalties results

Norms treatment

Norms results

US Origin treatment

US Origin results

Conclusion

7 Conclusion

What have we learned about shell companies?

Experiments as a solution to scholarly and policy problems

Experimental transnational relations

Appendices Chapter 2 Appendix: Explaining the global shell game

General background

Registration, Institutional Review Board, and university clearance

Sample

Randomization strategy

Randomization sensitivity

Interventions and procedures

Letter content

English as official language email sample (free of obvious errors)

Non-English email example (with standardized misspelling)

Treatments

Origin countries

Aliases and deception

Minimizing detection risks

Protocol for sending emails

The outcomes

Operational coding of outcomes

Non-response

Non-compliance

Part-compliance

Compliance

Refusal

Following up and ending communication

Example replies

Non-compliant

Part-compliant

Compliant

Refusal

Waves

Analysis strategy

Companion survey

Service providers

Corporate service provider survey

Overall results by treatment, international/US

Chapter 3 Appendix: Overall compliance and country groupings

Chapter 4 Appendix: Terrorism, Corruption, Premium

Chapter 5 Appendix: FATF and ACAMS

Chapter 6 Appendix: Penalties, Norms, US Origin

References

Index

Series

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