Chapter
1 A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture
A Brief Genealogy of the Capture Thesis
The Long (Rather Than Short) History of Economic Regulation in America
Corruption: The Original Capture Theory
2 The Concept of Regulatory Capture
3 Detecting and Measuring Capture
Understandings of Capture
Problems With Capture Inferences
Toward a Better Pattern of Study, Claims, and Inferences
Section II New Conceptions of Capture - Mechanisms and Outcomes
4 Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis
How Cultural Capture Works
5 Complexity, Capacity, and Capture
6 Preventing Economists’ Capture
The Forces That Lead to Regulatory Capture
How These Forces Capture Economists
Career Outside of Academia
Biases at the Promotion Level
Economists Not Interested in Money
Preventing Economists’ Capture
Indirect Benefits of Antitrust Enforcement
Shaming Economists Without Principles
Mandatory Disclosure of Expert Witnesses
A New Governance of the Publishing Market
The Importance of Being Nerds
7 Corrosive Capture? The Dueling Forces of Autonomy and Industry Influence in FDA Pharmaceutical Regulation
The Idea of Corrosive Capture
Pharmaceutical Regulation: A Review of Institutional Development
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938
Pharmaceutical Regulation: A Review of Statistical Evidence
Measuring Familiarity: Submissions and Mergers
U.S. versus non-U.S. firms
Related Considerations and Conclusion
Section III Regulatory Case Studies
The Traditional Story: Capture of the Expansion Decision
A New Look at the Historical Record: The Presence of Disconfirming Evidence
A Broad Coalition Against the Expansion Proposal
Broadcasters Were Divided
Expected Broadcaster Rents May Have Been Smaller than Assumed
What Comes Next: A Detailed Review of the Evidence
The Federal Radio Commission
Expanding the Broadcasting Band: A Decidedly Unpopular Proposal
Amateur Radio Operators and Experimenters
Misunderstood Motives: The Role of Advertising in Early Radio
9 Conditional Forbearance as an Alternative to Capture
The Coal Industry: Technology and Safety
Federal Mine Safety Regulation in the United States
The MSHA Enforcement Process
Accusations of Agency Capture
Empirical Strategy: Challenges to Identification and Interpretation
Preliminary Results: Public Awareness and Company Performance
10 Captured by Disaster? Reinterpreting Regulatory Behavior in the Shadow of the Gulf Oil Spill
The Basis for the Oil and Gas Industry’s Capture of MMS
Department of the Interior Deficiencies and MMS’s Organizational Development
The Creation of MMS as Background for Assessing Its Capture
Congressional Oversight and MMS Appropriations
Connecting Revenue Collection to MMS’s Capture
Political Trends, Changing Technology, and Balancing Multiple Objectives at MMS
Considering Political and Public Preferences in a Theory of MMS’s Capture
Evaluating the Redesign of Federal Oil and Gas Functions
11 Reconsidering Agency Capture During Regulatory Policymaking
Theoretical Foundations and a Two-Prong Test
Capture in Quantitative Rulemaking Studies
Two-Prong Test and Testable Expectations
State Administrators Survey
Subpopulation Participation
12 Coalitions, Autonomy, and Regulatory Bargains in Public Health Law
Analytical Foundations: Institutional Constraints and Partial Autonomy
Food Safety and the Renegotiation of Regulatory Bargains
Tobacco Regulation and the Interplay of Regulatory Innovation and Legislation
Building Capacity to Influence Regulation Through Public Health Surveillance
Implications: Coalitions, Autonomy, and the State
Section IV The Possibility of Preventing Capture
13 Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment Programs
A Brief History of Consumer Empowerment Programs
Three Consumer Empowerment Models in Insurance Regulation
The Texas Office of Public Insurance Counsel
California’s Public Participation Program
The NAIC Consumer Participation Program
Preliminary Thoughts on Consumer Empowerment Programs in Insurance Regulation
Deploying and Designing Proxy Advocates
Deploying and Designing Tripartism
14 Courts and Regulatory Capture
The Basics of Judicial Review
Judicial Review and Regulatory Capture
Judicial Review as a Cost on Change
Judicial Review as a Brake on Capture
15 Can Executive Review Help Prevent Capture?
Traditional Accounts of Regulatory Review and Capture
Capture and Presidential Power
Problems in the Presidential Power Justification
Institutional Features of OIRA That Facilitate an Anti-capture Role
Benefits of a Generalist Perspective
Appointment of OIRA Administrators
New Perspectives on Regulatory Capture
A New Empirical Approach to Diagnosing Capture
Strategies and Mechanisms for Preventing Capture
Preventing Regulatory Capture
：Special Interest Influence and How to Limit it
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