Securities against Misrule ：Juries, Assemblies, Elections

Publication subTitle ：Juries, Assemblies, Elections

Author： Jon Elster  

Publisher： Cambridge University Press‎

Publication year： 2013

E-ISBN: 9781107302945

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9781107031739

Subject： D035 State administration

Keyword： 政治理论

Language： ENG

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Securities against Misrule

Description

Elster proposes a normative theory of collective decision making, inspired by Jeremy Bentham but not including his utilitarian philosophy. The central proposal is that in designing democratic institutions one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. There is no independently defined good outcome that institutions can track, nor is there any way of reliably selecting good decision makers. In addition to a long initial chapter that surveys theories of collective decision making, notably social choice theory, and a chapter expounding and discussing Bentham's views, historical chapters on the jury, constituent assemblies and electoral systems develop and illustrate the main ideas. This work draws on a welter of case studies and historical episodes, from Thucydides and Plutarch to the present. It is also grounded in psychology, behavioral economics and law.

Chapter

Cover

Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments

Introduction

1 The Normative Study of Collective Decision Making

I. introduction: individual choice

II. Collective Decisions

III. Collective Decision-Making Processes

IV. Good Collective Decisions

V. Good Collective Decision-Making Procedures

Arguing Toward Unanimity

Deciding by Aggregation

Deciding by Bargaining

VI. Strategic Behavior

Strategic Uses of Argument

Strategic Behavior in Aggregation

VII. The Benthamite Approach to Collective Decision Making

2 Ignorance, Secrecy, and Publicity in Jury Decision Making

I. Introduction

II. Composing the Pool, the Panel, and the Jury

III. The Trial

IV. Jury Deliberation and Voting

Choice of Foreperson

Communication Among the Jurors

Recording Jury Deliberations

Giving Reasons

Revealing the Deliberations

Open or Secret Voting

Revealing the Number of Votes and the Identity of Voters

V. Conclusion

3 A Dialogue with Bentham

I. Introduction

II. Aptitude of Voters

III. Aptitude of Deputies

IV. Constitutionalism and Rights

V. Bentham and Condorcet

VI. Conclusion

4 The Optimal Design of Constituent Assemblies

I. Introduction

II. The Task of the Constituent Assembly

III. Location of the Assembly

IV. The Size and Duration of the Assembly

V. Elections to the Assembly

VI. Secrecy and Publicity – Interest and Passion

VII. Ratifying the Constitution

VIII. Conclusion

5 Cross-Voting: A Study in Failure

I. Introduction

II. Voters and Eligibles

III. Cross-Voting at the Estates-General

IV. Cross-Voting in the United States, 1787–1789

V. Some Contemporary Examples

VI. Conclusion: The Fragility of Incentive Systems

Conclusion

I. Costs

II. Diversity

III. Overrides

IV. Indeterminacy

V. Political Will

References

Index

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