Cover

The Political Construction of Business Interests

Series

Dedication

Title

Copyright

Contents

Figures

Tables

Acknowledgments

Introduction

1: Collective Political Engagement and the Welfare State

Introduction

Our Scholarly Inspirations

Labor Activism, Skills, and Varieties of Capitalism

Networks, Associations, and the Construction of Preferences

Historical Institutionalism and the State in the Construction of the Social Classes

Varieties of Encompassing Employers’ Associations

Partisan Origins of Encompassing Employers’ Associations

Impacts of Peak Employers’ Associations on Policy Preferences

Business Organization, Equality, and Economic Growth

Conclusion

2: The Political Origins of Coordinated Capitalism

Introduction

Theories of Business Organization

Industrialization

Labor Activism

Party Systems and State Structures

Cross-National Quantitative Analysis

Methodology

Measurement for Historical Quantitative Analysis

Estimation

Findings

Quantitative Findings and Historical National Experiences

Industrialization

Labor Mobilization as a Cause of Employer Organization

Party System Characteristics

Conclusion

3: Party Conflict and the Origins of Danish Labor Market Coordination

Introduction

Theories of Danish Business Organization

Industrialization

Labor: Activism and Skills

The Structure of Party Competition and Danish Employers

The Formation of the Danish Employers’ Confederation of 1896

Right Party’s Interests and Niels Andersen’s Role

Political Ambitions: Unifying Business Policy Positions and Self-Regulation

Industrial Peace

The September Compromise and the Danish Model

Further Consolidation and Centralization of DA’s Power

Conclusion

4: British Experiments in National Employers’ Organization

Introduction

Theories of British Employers’ Organization

Patterns of Industrialization

Labor Characteristics

Party Competition and the Evolution of British Employers’ Associations

The Absence of a National Organization at Century’s Turn

The Federation of British Industries

Background Context for the Formation of the FBI

Conservative Party Constituency-Building Efforts

The Formation of the Federation of British Industries

The Federation of British Industry’s Downfall

Conclusion

5: Sectional Parties and Divided Business in the United States

Introduction

Theories of American Business Organization

Industrialization and the Evolution of U.S. Business Representation

Labor and American Employers

Party Competition and Employers’ Associations: Segmented Parties, Divided Business

Rise and Decline of the National Association of Manufacturers

The Republican’s Strategic Interests in Business Organization

The Formation of the National Association of Manufacturers

NAM’s Goals for Industrial Coordination, Labor Peace, and Corporatist Representation

The Failure of Coordination

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce

The Legacy of Dueling Employers’ Associations

Conclusion

6: The Origins of Sector Coordination in Germany

Introduction

The Determinants of German Sectoral Coordination

Characteristics of Industrialism

German Labor and the Industrial Relations System

Deficits of the German Party System

The Formation of Encompassing Employers’ Associations

Political Challenges for Bismarck and the German Industrialists

The Formation of the Central Association of German Industrialists

The Formation of the Bund der Industriellen

Incentives for Coordination during and after World War I

The Formation of the Reich Association of German Industry

Conclusion

7: Twenty-First Century Breakdown? Challenges to Coordination in the Postindustrial Age

Introduction

The Paradox of Postindustrial Capitalism

Continued Divergence of Modes of Market Coordination?

Postindustrial Determinants of Nonmarket Coordination

Postindustrial Challenges

Political Institutions and Agency in the Postindustrial Era

Empirical Analysis: Measurement and Estimation

Estimation

Findings

Determinants of Nonmarket Coordination in the Postindustrial Era

The Impact of Political Institutions on State Capacity

Conclusion

8: Institutional Sources of Employers’ Preferences for Social Policy

Introduction

Employers and Policy Responses to Postindustrial Challenges

Firms’ Preferences for Social Protections

Economic Determinants of Social Spending and Preferences

Labor Determinants of National Spending and Firms’ Preferences

Political Structural Determinants of National Spending and Firms’ Preferences

Organizational Influences on Preferences and Social Policies

Macrocorporatism

Policy Impacts of Employers’ Organization at the National Level

Findings: National Level Analysis of ALMP and Social Protection

A Study of Firms and Active Social Policy in Denmark and the United Kingdom

Findings

Conclusion

9: Employers, Coordination, and Active Labor Market Policy in Postindustrial Denmark

Introduction

The Danish Model, Crises, and Reforms

The Danish Model

Challenges to Employer Coordination and the Welfare State

Neoliberal Policy Reforms

Sustaining Macrocorporatist Coordination

The Impact of Macrocorporatism on Active Labor Market Policy

Macrocorporatist Impacts on Subsequent Bourgeois Reforms

Conclusion

10: Employers and Active Labor Market Policy in Postindustrial Britain

Introduction

Cleavages, Crises, and Reforms

Failed Efforts to Build Labor Market Coordination

Impact of Failed Coordination on Active Labor Market Reforms

The New Deal Active Labor Market Reform

Involving Employers in the New Deal Programs

Conclusion

11: The Failure of Coordination and the Rise of Dualism in Germany

Introduction

The German Model, Crises, and Reforms

Postindustrial Challenges to Sector Coordination and Social Protection

Structural Adjustment: Employers, Labor, and the State

Policy Responses to Postindustrialization: Neoliberalism in the German Context

The Failure of Cooperation: Sector Coordination, State Weakness and the Minimal Role of Employers

The Failure of National Cooperation: Sector Coordination and the German State

Employers and the Rise of Dualism

Conclusion

12: The Political Foundations of Redistribution and Equality

Introduction

Class, Redistribution, and Equality

Determinants of Redistribution and Equality

Economic Determinants of Redistribution

Labor Determinants of Redistribution

Democratic Politics and Institutions

Organizational Determinants of Redistribution

Empirical Analyses

Findings for Coordination and Redistribution

Findings for Low-Wage Work, Market Inequality, and Labor Market Dualism

Coordination and Economic Growth

Conclusion

Conclusion: Social Solidarity after the Crisis of Finance Capitalism

Introduction

The State, Institutions for Coordination, and Equality

The Logic of Postfinance Capitalism and Politics of Solidarity

Implications for Regimes of Coordination

Conclusion

Bibliography

Academic, Government, Interest Group Publications

Index