Description
Since the famous debate between Keynes and Ohlin on German reparation payments after World War I, international transfers have attracted the attention of economists. Today the subject is of even greater importance with billions of dollars flowing between nations as unilateral transfers. However the emphasis has shifted from balance-of-payments issues to the welfare consequences following a transfer and in particular the welfare issues arising from aid to developing countries. In The Economics of International Transfers, first published in 1998, Professors Brakman and van Marrewijk present an overview of transfers (including the history of transfers and current transfer flows) and their own unified framework in which they present important and original research. Subjects considered include welfare effects, distortions, third parties, rent-seeking, the 'trade or aid' discussion, multi-lateral agencies, tied aid and imperfect competition.
Chapter
1.4.5 Charles bastable's critique
1.5 German transfer problems
1.5.1 Franco-german indemnity of 1871
1.5.2 German payments after world war i
1.5.3 Current german transfer problems
1.6 Evaluation of some historical transfers
1.7 From war reparations payments to foreign aid
2 The Keynes-Ohlin controversy
2.2 The issues in the debate
2.2.1 Keynes's original argument
2.3 Some problems resolved
2.3.1 Partial equilibrium
2.3.2 Small expenditure on foreign goods
2.A Appendix: over- and undereffected transfers
3 Welfare effects: Samuelson's theorem
3.1 Transfers: more than a balance-of-payments problem
3.2 The transfer paradox: Leontief 's example
3.4 Samuelson's theorem: the model
3.4.1 Walrasian stability
3.5 Samuelson's theorem: the results
3.A Appendix: net demand and the offer curve
4 Generalizations of Samuelson's theorem
4.2.1 The modeling of public goods
4.2.2 Public goods and transfers
4.4 Endogenous transfers I
5 Clouds on the horizon 1: distortions
5.1 Immiserizing growth and the administration of foreign aid
5.1.1 Immiserizing growth or advantageous destruction
5.1.2 The costs of administration
5.2.1 Sticky wage unemployment
5.2.2 Harris-Todaro unemployment
5.3 Transfer of factors of production
5.4 Lobbying and rent-seeking
5.5.1 Tariff imposed by the recipient
5.5.2 Tariff imposed by the donor: trade or aid?
6 Clouds on the horizon 2: third parties
6.1 From two to three: a trivial extension?
6.2 The transfer paradox: Gale's example
6.5 A decomposition of welfare effects
6.5.1 Donor welfare decomposition
6.5.2 Recipient welfare decomposition
6.5.3 Alternative conditions for paradoxes
6.6 Endogenous transfers II
7 The economics of multilateral transfers
7.2 Multilateral transfers
7.4 Transfers, politics and welfare
7.5 Pareto-improving transfers
8 The consequences of tied aid
8.2 Tied aid with two countries
8.3 A discussion of tied aid
8.4 Marginally tied aid with three countries
8.5 The ``forced choice'' approach
8.5.1 The terms of trade and the donor
8.5.2 Effective tying and the recipient
8.5.3 Tying to the numeÂraire and other complications
9.4.2 Aid tied to manufactures in general
9.5 A fictitious restriction?
9.6 Differences in demand elasticity
9.A Appendix: effective tying
10 Dynamics, money and the balance of payments
10.2 Quasi dynamics with complete futures markets
10.3 Financial transfers and the balance of payments
10.4.1 The neoclassical growth model
10.4.2 Continuous transfers in the neoclassical growth model
A.3 Indirect utility function
A.5 Relations between the indirect utility function and the expenditure function
A.6 Constant elasticity of substitution
A.6.3 The expenditure function
A.7.2 First-order conditions
A.7.3 A cookbook procedure
A.7.4 Current-value hamiltonian
The Economics of International Transfers
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