The World Without, the Mind Within ：An Essay on First-Person Authority ( Cambridge Studies in Philosophy )

Publication subTitle ：An Essay on First-Person Authority

Publication series ：Cambridge Studies in Philosophy

Author： André Gallois  

Publisher： Cambridge University Press‎

Publication year： 1996

E-ISBN: 9780511821745

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780521560931

Subject： B80 Noetic Sciences

Keyword： 认识论

Language： ENG

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The World Without, the Mind Within

Description

In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge.

Chapter

Cover

Half-title

Title

Copyright

Dedication

Contents

Preface

Introduction

PART I FIRST-PERSON AUTHORITY

1 The problem

2 Scepticism about first-person authority

PART II THE BASIC AND EXTENDED ACCOUNTS

3 A preliminary account

4 Defending the basic account

5 Extending the basic account

6 Objections

7 The problem of scope

PART III SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND CONTENT EXTERNALISM

8 Arguments from content externalism

9 Deflationary self-knowledge: Davidson and Burge

10 Externalism and first-person authority

11 Psychological properties as secondary

Bibliography

Index

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