Contents

Preface

Chapter 1

An Empirical Study on the Relationship between the CEO Age and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap: The Moderating Role of the Knowledge Intensity

Abstract

1.1. Introduction

1.2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

1.2.1. Research on the Antecedents of the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

1.2.2. Research on the Effects of the CEO Age on the Executive Compensation

1.2.3. Research on the Effects of the CEO Age on the Other Organizational Variables

1.2.4. Hypotheses Development

1.3. Method

1.3.1. Measures

1.3.2. Sample and Data

1.4. Empirical Test

1.4.1. Main Results

1.4.2. Robustness Test

a. The Robustness Test on the Measure of the CEO Age

b. The Robustness Test on the Measure of the Knowledge Intensity

c. The Robustness Test on the Choice of the Control Variables

d. The Robustness Test on the Data Analysis Method

1.4.3. Discussion

1.4.4. Further Empirical Explorations

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Chapter 2

An Investigation on the Positive Nonlinear Relationship between the CEO Tenure and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

Abstract

2.1. Introduction

2.2. Literature and Hypothesis

a. The Motivations Changes and the CEOs’ Attitude towards the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap during the CEO Tenure

b. The Capability Changes and the CEOs’ Attitude towards the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap during the CEO Tenure

c. The Feelings Concerns and the CEOs’ Attitude towards the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap during the CEO Tenure

2.3. Research Design

2.3.1. Measures

2.3.2. Sample and Data

2.4. Empirical Test

2.4.1. Main Results

2.4.2. A Further Exploration on the Moderating Role of the Technology Intensity

2.4.3. A Further Comparison on the Effects of the CEO Tenure on the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap under Different Technology Intensity

2.4.4. A Further Comparison on the Effect of the CEO Tenure on the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap under Different CEO Tenure

2.5. Robustness Test and Discussion

2.5.1. Robustness Test

2.5.2. Discussion

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Chapter 3

Can the Independent Directors Determine the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap? An Empirical Study Based on Chinese Listed Manufacturing Companies

Abstract

3.1. Introduction

3.2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

3.3. Method

3.3.1. Sample and Data

3.3.2. Measures

3.4. Empirical Analysis

3.4.1. Main Results

3.4.2. Robustness Test

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Chapter 4

A Study on the Multiple Effects of the Board of Supervisors on the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

Abstract

4.1. Introduction

4.2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

a. The Board of Supervisors and the Firm’s Performance

b. The Board of Supervisors and the Information Disclosure Quality

c. The Board of Supervisors and the Monitoring Effectiveness of the Board of Supervisors

d. The Board of Supervisors and the Other Organizational Variables

e. The Board of Supervisors and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

4.3. Research Design

4.3.1. Sample and Data

4.3.2. Measures

4.3.3. Descriptive Statistics Results of the Research Variables

4.3.4. Correlation Analysis of the Research Variables

4.3.5. Empirical Models

4.4. Empirical Results

4.4.1. Main Results

a. The Test of H4-1

b. The Test of H4-2

c. The Test of H4-3

d. The Test of H4-4

e. The Test of H4-5

f. The Test of H4-6

4.4.2. Robustness Test

4.4.3. Discussion and Suggestions

a. Discussion

b. Suggestions

Conclusion

Acknowledgements

References

Chapter 5

A Study on the Nonlinear Relationship among the CEO Educational Background, Employee Compensation and Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

Abstract

5.1. Introduction

5.2. Literature and Hypotheses

5.3. Method

5.3.1. Measures

5.3.2. Sample and Data

5.4. Empirical Test

5.4.1. Main Results on H5-1

5.4.2. Robustness Test of H5-1

5.4.3. Main Results on H5-2

5.4.4. Robustness Test of H5-2

5.4.5. Discussion

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Chapter 6

How the Female Executives Affect the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap? Evidence from Chinese Listed Manufacturing Companies

Abstract

6.1. Introduction

6.2. Literature Review and the Hypotheses

6.2.1. The Positive Role of the Female Executives from the Perspectives of the Principal-Agent Theory and the Resource Dependency Theory

6.2.2. The Negative Role of the Female Executives from the Perspectives of the Human Capital Theory and the Feminism Theory

6.2.3. The Null Role of the Female Executives from the Perspective of the Assimilation Theory

6.3. Method

6.3.1. Sample

6.3.2. Measures

6.3.3. Data

6.4. Empirical Test

6.4.1. Main Results

6.4.2. Robustness Test

6.5. Discussion and Further Investigation

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Chapter 7

An Empirical Study on the Effects of the CEO’s Downward Overstepping Behavior on the Executive Compensation Gap and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

Abstract

7.1. Introduction

7.2. The Conceptual Model on the Linkages among the CEO’s DOB, the Executive Compensation Gap and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

7.3. Model Analysis and Hypotheses Development on the Potential Positive Effect of the CEO’s DOB on the Executive Compensation Gap

7.3.1. Path 1: The CEO’s DOB, the Capability Evaluation and the Executive Compensation Gap

7.3.2. Path 2: The CEO’s DOB, the Effort Evaluation and the Executive Compensation Gap

7.3.3. Path 3: The CEO’s DOB, the Motivation Needs and the Executive Compensation Gap

7.3.4. Path 4: The CEO’s DOB, the KCN and the Executive Compensation Gap

7.4. Model Analysis and Hypotheses Development on the Potential Negative Effect of the CEO’s DOB on the Executive Compensation Gap

7.4.1. Path 5: The CEO’s DOB, the Executive Discretion and the Executive Compensation Gap

7.4.2. Path 6: The CEO’s DOB, the Internal Monitoring and the Executive Compensation Gap

7.4.3. Path 7: The CEO’s DOB, the Territorial Behavior and the Executive Compensation Gap

7.4.4. Path 8: The CEO’s DOB, the Growth Potential and the Executive Compensation Gap

7.5. Model Analysis and the Hypotheses Development on the Potential Positive Effects of the CEO’s DOB on the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

7.5.1. Path 1: The CEO’s DOB, the Capability Evaluation and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

7.5.2. Path 2: The CEO’s DOB, the Effort Evaluation and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

7.5.3. Path 3: The CEO’s DOB, the Motivation Needs and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

7.5.4. Path 4: The CEO’s DOB, the KCN and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

7.6. Model Analysis and Hypotheses Development on the Potential Negative Effect of the CEO’s DOB on the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

7.6.1. Path 5: The CEO’s DOB, the Employees’ Job Discretion and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

7.6.2. Path 6: The CEO’s DOB, the Internal Monitoring and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

7.6.3. Path 7: The CEO’s DOB, the Territorial Behavior and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

7.6.4. Path 8: The CEO’s DOB, the Growth Potential and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

7.6.5. Path 9: The CEO’s DOB and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap: The Mediating Role of the Executive Compensation Gap

7.7. Methods

7.7.1. Sample

7.7.2. Measures

7.7.3. Data

7.7.4. Empirical Models

7.8. Empirical Analysis

7.8.1. Main Results

7.8.2. The Robustness Tests and Further Studies

a. The Robustness Test on the Measures of the Executive Compensation Gap and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

b. The Robustness Test with the Method of Sub-Group Comparison

c. The Robustness Test on the Choice of the Different Control Variables

d. The Robustness Test Considering the Time Lag Effect

7.8.3. Discussion

Conclusion

Acknowledgements

References

Chapter 8

The Relationship between the CEO-Employee Discretion Gap and the Perceived Executive-Employee Compensation Gap: Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises

Abstract

8.1. Introduction

8.2. Literature Review and the Hypotheses Development

8.2.1. Theoretical Perspectives on the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

a. The Marginal Productivity Theory and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

b. The Tournament Theory and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

c. The Organizational Justice Theory and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

d. The Peer Benchmarking Theory and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

e. The Agency Theory and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

f. The Optimal Contracting Approach and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

g. The CEO Discretion Approach and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

8.2.2. Effects of the CEO Discretion on the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

8.2.3. Hypotheses on the Relationships among the CEO Discretion, the Employee Discretion and the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap

8.3. Methodology

8.3.1. Sample and Data Collection

8.3.2. Measures

a. The Dependent Variables

b. The Independent Variables

c. The Control Variables

8.3.3. Descriptive Statics and Pearson’s Correlations

8.4. Results and Discussion

8.4.1. The Main Results

8.4.2. The Robustness Test

8.4.3. Discussion

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Chapter 9

An Exploratory Investigation on the Effect of the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap on the Workplace Territorial Behavior

Abstract

9.1. Introduction

9.2. Literature Review and Model Development

9.2.1. Concept and Constructs of the Territorial Behavior

9.2.2. Consequences of the Territorial Behavior

9.2.3. Antecedents of the Territorial Behavior

9.2.4. Model Building

9.3. Relationship among the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap, the POS and the Territorial Behavior: The Moderating Roles of the Trust and the Gratitude

9.3.1. Relationship between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the POS: The Moderating Role of the Trust

9.3.2. Relationship between the POS and the Territorial Behavior: The Moderating Role of the Gratitude

9.4. Relationship among the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap, the Employee Engagement and the Territorial Behavior: The Moderating Role of the Trust and the Gratitude

9.4.1. Relationship between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the Employee Engagement: The Moderating Role of the Trust

9.4.2. Relationship between the Employee Engagement and the Territorial Behavior: The Moderating Role of the Gratitude

9.5. Relationship among the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap, the OCB and the Territorial Behavior: The Moderating Roles of the Trust and the Gratitude

9.5.1. Relationship between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the OCB: The Moderating Role of the Trust

9.5.2. Relationship between the OCB and the Territorial Behavior: The Moderating Role of the Gratitude

9.6. Relationship among the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap, the LMX and the Territorial Behavior: The Moderating Roles of the Trust and the Gratitude

9.6.1. Relationship between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the LMX: The Moderating Role of the Trust

9.6.2. Relationship between the LMX and the Territorial Behavior: The Moderating Role of the Gratitude

Conclusion

Acknowledgements

References

Chapter 10

An Exploratory Study on the Relationship between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the Knowledge Loss: The Moderating Role of the Compensation Communication

Abstract

10.1. Introduction

10.2. Literature Review in the Knowledge Loss and Model Building

10.2.1. The Knowledge and the Knowledge Loss

10.2.2. Model Building on the Relationship between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the Knowledge Loss

10.3. Model Refining by Introducing the Compensation Communication as the Moderator

10.4. A Preliminary Empirical Test on the Extended Model

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Chapter 11

An Investigation on the Inverse U-Shaped Relationship between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the Employee Turnover

Abstract

11.1. Introduction

11.2. Literature Review and the Hypothesis Development

11.2.1. Literature Review on the Employee Turnover

a. The Organizational Commitment and the Employee Turnover

b. The POS and the Employee Turnover

c. The QWL and the Employee Turnover

d. The Job Stress and the Employee Turnover

e. The Organizational Culture, the Job Satisfaction and the Employee Turnover

11.2.2. The Hypothesis Development

11.3. Method

11.3.1. Sample and Data

11.3.2. Measures

11.3.3. Model

11.4. Empirical Results

11.4.1. The Main Results

11.4.2. A Further Investigation on the Relationship between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the Employees’ Turnover Ratio under Different Executive-Employee Compensation Gaps

11.4.3. A Further Investigation on the Relationship between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the Employees’ Turnover Ratio under Different R&D Intensity

11.4.4. A Further Investigation on the Relationship between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the Employees’ Turnover Ratio under Different Levels of ROA

11.4.5. A Further Investigation on the Relationship between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the Employees’ Turnover Ratio under Different Employees’ Compensation Levels

11.4.6. Discussion

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Chapter 12

An Exploratory Study on the Effect of the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap on the Individual Innovative Behavior

Abstract

12.1. Introduction

12.2. Literature Review and Model Building

12.3. An Investigation on the Mediating Effect of the Psychological Ownership on the Link between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the Individual Innovative Behavior

12.4. An Investigation on the Mediating Effect of the Leader-Membership Exchange on the Linkage between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the Individual Innovative Behavior

12.5. An Investigation on the Mediating Effect of the Sense of Self-Efficacy on the Link between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the Individual Innovative Behavior

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Chapter 13

An Investigation on the Relationship between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the Firm’s Future Performance: The Moderating Roles of the Technology Intensity and the Pay-Performance Sensitivity Strategy

Abstract

13.1. Introduction

13.2. Literature Review and the Hypotheses

13.2.1. The Performance Consequences of the Compensation Gap in the Economic View

13.2.2. The Performance Consequences of the Compensation Gap in the Behavioral View

13.2.3. The Hypotheses on the Moderating Roles of the Technology Intensity and the Pay-Performance Sensitivity Strategy on the Link between the Executive-Employee Compensation Gap and the Firm’s Performance

13.3. Method

13.3.1. The Sample

13.3.2. The Measurements

13.3.3. The Data

13.3.4. The Empirical Models

13.4. Results and Discussion

13.4.1. The Empirical Test on H13-1

13.4.2. The Robustness Test on H13-1

13.4.3. The Empirical Test on H13-2

13.4.4. The Robustness Test on H13-2

13.4.5. Discussion

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

Author’s Contact Information

Index

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