Auctions with selective entry and risk averse bidders: theory and evidence

E-ISSN： 1756-2171|46|3|524-545

ISSN： 0741-6261

Source： THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol.46, Iss.3, 2015-09, pp. : 524-545

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