Explaining Political Judgement

Author: Perri 6;  

Publisher: Cambridge University Press‎

Publication year: 2011

E-ISBN: 9781316964620

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9781107009226

P-ISBN(Hardback):  9781107009226

Subject: D0 Political Theory

Keyword: 外交、国际关系

Language: ENG

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Description

A fresh theory of political judgement, using analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis to provide new implications for political science. This book presents a fresh, rigorous explanatory theory of judgement, its varieties and its consequences, drawing upon Durkheim and Douglas. The author develops his theory through a detailed study of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and concludes by setting out wider implications for political science. This book presents a fresh, rigorous explanatory theory of judgement, its varieties and its consequences, drawing upon Durkheim and Douglas. The author develops his theory through a detailed study of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and concludes by setting out wider implications for political science. What is political judgement? Why do politicians exhibit such contrasting thought styles in making decisions, even when they agree ideologically? What happens when governments with contrasting thought styles have to deal with each other? In this book Perri 6 presents a fresh, rigorous explanatory theory of judgement, its varieties and its consequences, drawing upon Durkheim and Douglas. He argues that policy makers will understand - and misunderstand - their problems and choices in ways that reproduce their own social organisation. This theory is developed by using the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 as an extended case study, examining the decision-making of the Kennedy, Castro and Khrushchev regimes. Explaining Political Judgement is the first comprehensive study to show what a neo-Durkheimian institutional approach can offer to political science and to the social sciences generally. 1. On political judgement; 2. The need for richer explanation; 3. A Durkheimian theoretical framework; 4. October 1962, before and after; 5. The Khrushchev régime; 6. The Kennedy administration; 7. The Castro revolutionary régime; 8. Implications; 9. Coda. 'Drawing upon neo-Durkheimian social anthropology, Perri 6 demonstrates the profound relevance of social and institutional context to an old issue (political judgment) in a familiar historical case (the Cuban Missile Crisis). This bold, refreshing, deeply fascinating cross-disciplinary foray challenges us to rethink our understandings of both.' David A. Welch, CIGI Chair of Global Security, Balsillie School of International Affairs 'It requires a good deal of courage to undertake an analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, given the iconic status of … Essence of Decision. Perri 6 has, however, done just that and done it in an interesting and important way. One does not have to agree with the arguments, but they can not be ignored. This is a fresh and theoretically intriguing approach to political judgment in general and the Crisis in particular.' B. Guy Peters, Maurice Falk Professor of American Government, University of Pittsburgh

Chapter

I

II

III

Do we need to explain judgement at all?

Not the common-or-garden problem with rational choice

Rationality needs institutions: but of what kind?

Endogenous preferences and rationalities

Attenuations of idealised rationality

Bounded rationality in games

Bayesian updating of prior information or assumptions

Heuristics, biases and analogies

Prospect theory

3 A Durkheimian theoretical framework

Forms of institutional explanation

Informal institutions

Core association

Expected range of variation

Ritual causal mechanisms and micro-foundations

The informal ritual order in politics and decision-making

Structure of explanation

Independent variables: measures of social organisation

Intermediating variables about mechanism

Dependent variables: political judgement

Categories, classification and anomalies

Hindsight and foresight

Risk strategy and the domain of losses

Framing the actor's self-image in relation to losses

Reasons and goals

Issue linkage

Expected values

Relationships between theories and models

Answering critiques

4 October 1962, before and after

Why re-examine the Cuban missile crisis?

A very short chronicle of the crisis

Decision to deploy: April to May

Build-up: May to September

The ‘gravest issues’ – a warning backfires: 4 September to 15 October

The choosers – ExComm and its lack of a counterpart: 16 to 22 October

Choices – Kennedy's options: 16 to 20 October

Rites of decision, rites of announcement: 17 to 22 October

Stand-off: 23 to 25 October

Manoeuvres on the brink: 26 October

Cross-wires and tripwires: 27 October

Climbdown at the last moment: 28 October

Aftermath

Theoretical frameworks applied to the Cuban missile crisis

5 The Khrushchev régime

Isolate institutions and networks

Individualism, but subaltern to isolate ordering

Ritual forms: meetings, conversations and rituals of decision; communication

Isolate political judgement: reasons and goals

Risk stance in the domain of losses

Framing the self

Loss framing

The limits of strategy for the structural isolate

Issue linkage

Category formation and anomaly management

Hindsight and foresight

Misunderstanding the opponent

6 The Kennedy administration

Individualistic institutions and networks

Ritual forms: meetings, conversations and rituals of decision; communication

Individualistic political judgement: reasons and goals

Risk stance in the domain of losses

Strategy under individualistic institutions

Category formation and anomaly management

Framing Soviet demands

Categorising issue linkage

Offensive weapons and defensive purposes

Hindsight and foresight

Misunderstanding the opponent

7 The Castro revolutionary régime

Enclaved institutions and networks

Enclaved political judgement: reasons and goals

Risk stance in the domain of gains under threat

Loss framing

Enclaved strategy

Issue linkage

Category formation and anomaly management

Hindsight and foresight

Misunderstanding the opponent

8 Implications

Implications for understanding the October crisis

Implications for characterising and explaining political judgement

Implications for neo-Durkheimian theory

Implications for rational choice and for institutional explanation

9 Coda

Notes

Epigraph

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

References

Index

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