The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation :Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy

Publication subTitle :Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy

Author: Jacques E. C. Hymans;  

Publisher: Cambridge University Press‎

Publication year: 2006

E-ISBN: 9781316958858

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780521850766

P-ISBN(Hardback):  9780521850766

Subject: D815.2 the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons

Keyword: 外交、国际关系

Language: ENG

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Description

This book analyzes the psychological factors that push state leaders to go, or not to go, nuclear. Dozens of states have long been capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, yet only a few have actually done so. Jacques E. C. Hymans finds that the key to this surprising historical pattern lies not in externally imposed constraints, but rather in state leaders' conceptions of the national identity. Dozens of states have long been capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, yet only a few have actually done so. Jacques E. C. Hymans finds that the key to this surprising historical pattern lies not in externally imposed constraints, but rather in state leaders' conceptions of the national identity. Dozens of states have long been capable of acquiring nuclear weapons, yet only a few have actually done so. Jacques E. C. Hymans finds that the key to this surprising historical pattern lies not in externally imposed constraints, but rather in state leaders' conceptions of the national identity. Synthesizing a wide range of scholarship from the humanities and social sciences to experimental psychology and neuroscience, Hymans builds a rigorous model of decisionmaking that links identity to emotions and ultimately to nuclear policy choices. Exhaustively researched case studies of France, India, Argentina, and Australia - two that got the bomb and two that abstained - demonstrate the value of this model while debunking common myths. This book will be invaluable to policymakers and concerned citizens who are frustrated with the frequent misjudgments of states' nuclear ambitions, and to scholars who seek a better understanding of how leaders make big foreign policy decisions. 1. Introduction: life in a nuclear-capable crowd; 2. Leaders' national identity conceptions and nuclear choices; 3. Measuring leaders' national identity conceptions; 4. The struggle over the bomb in the French Fourth Republic; 5. Australia's search for security: nuclear armament, umbrella, or abolition?; 6. Argentina's nuclear ambition … and restraint; 7. 'We have a big bomb now': India's nuclear U-turn; 8. Conclusion: lessons for policy. 'A novel, compelling challenge to the conventional wisdom on why some states obtain nuclear weapons. This systematic study provides important ideas regarding nuclear proliferation that will receive serious consideration.' Alexander George, Stanford University 'Hymans has written an exceptionally good book. He asks why states choose to develop nuclear weapons and finds that most of what we think we know about this critical decision is wrong. Challenging interpretations that rest on strategic calculations, norms in the international system and bureaucratic considerations, Hymans develops a novel theory emphasizing how individual leaders conceive of their nation's identity. He explores the power of his theory by analyzing the French, Argentine, Australian, and Indian decisions regarding nuclear weapons. His case-studies are rich histories in their own right, delving deeply into first-source documents and original interviews. Beyond the impressive theoretical and empirical contribution, Hymans also offers important policy lessons for the future that should be read widely.' Richard K. Herrmann, Ohio State University 'The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation is a sophisticated effort at theory building that draws together contemporary debates about identity and the latest research on affect/emotions to arrive at an explanation of why states go nuclear. This is

Chapter

2 Leaders’ national identity conceptions and nuclear choices

The decision to go nuclear: a big decision

The national identity conception (NIC): definition and types

The concept of the “national identity conception”

Typology of national identity conceptions

From NICs to nuclear decisions

The generic pathway from NICs to choice

NIC-linked emotions and their behavioral tendencies

Hypotheses on NICs and nuclear choices

Theory-testing and contextualization

Testing the theory

Placing decisions for nuclear weapons in context

3 Measuring leaders’ national identity conceptions

Methodological considerations

Operationalizing identity: concept streamlining

A multimethod approach

Source material

The quantitative coding frame

Reliability and validity

Australia

Existing perspectives on Australian identity conceptions

The data sources

The content analysis

Overall judgments

Argentina

Existing perspectives on Argentine identity conceptions

The data sources

The content analysis

Overall judgments

India

Existing perspectives on Indian identity conceptions

The data sources

The content analysis

Overall judgments

France

Existing perspectives on French identity conceptions

The data sources

The content analysis

Overall judgments

4 The struggle over the bomb in the French Fourth Republic

Introduction

Nuclear France before 1954

De Gaulle in the immediate postwar period: “We have time.”

The early years of the Fourth Republic: an “absence of nuclear-mindedness”

1950–52: Discussions of German rearmament and the first attempted renunciation

The year of decision: 1954

Dien Bien Phu

New Look and the nuclearization of the Cold War

Pierre Mendès France and the attempt to contain German rearmament

Mendès France’s oppositional nationalism and the bomb decision

After 1954: the road to the bomb

5 Australia’s search for security: nuclear umbrella, armament, or abolition?

Introduction

The traditional Liberals, 1949–67: participation in free world defenses

Still searching for a stronger guarantee: 1957–63

Still no Plan B: 1964–67

A new kind of Liberal: Gorton’s quest for the bomb, 1968–71

The fight over the NPT

Moves toward nuclear weapons: the power reactor and uranium enrichment

Labor in power, 1972–75: fear no more

Whitlam’s nuclear stances

The campaign against French nuclear testing

After Whitlam

6 Argentina’s nuclear ambition – and restraint

Introduction

Argentina’s nuclear choices to 1974

Diplomatic policies

Technology policies: the first power reactor

The second power reactor

The gaucho–gringo tangle: 1974–89

Carter, Videla, and the Tlatelolco Treaty

Continuing progress in the nuclear program via the tactics of “blackmail” and “bribery”

Argentina’s secret uranium enrichment plant: genesis and purposes

Summary: North America pushes, Argentina pushes back

A Southern Cone nuclear arms race?

The Argentine–Brazilian nuclear accord of 1980

Argentina’s non-bomb lobby

Nuclear policies of the Alfonsín government

The Menem nuclear policy shift

7 “We have a big bomb now”: India’s nuclear U-turn

Introduction

The nuclear expression of Indian nationalism, 1947–71

Nehruvian India’s nuclear diplomacy

Nehruvian India’s push for nuclear development

India in the aftermath of China’s nuclear test

India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion”

Nuclear India as of 1971

Explaining the “peaceful nuclear explosion”

The 1971 war and its aftermath

India’s nuclear stance between 1974 and 1998

The decision for “weaponization”

The 1995 test non-decision

The BJP bomb

Why Vajpayee chose to go nuclear

8 Conclusion: lessons for policy

Identities, emotions, and the nuclear choice

Puncturing common myths

Myth No. 1: “States want the bomb because it is a great deterrent”

Myth No. 2: “States want the bomb as a ticket to international status”

Myth No. 3: “Behind the decision for the bomb stand the mean interests of those who stand to benefit personally from it”

Myth No.4: “The international non-proliferation regime is the finger in the dike protecting the world from a cascade of new nuclear wepons states"

Lessons for intelligence analysis

Lessons for international policy

A stricter international non-proliferation regime?

Nuclear abolition?

Preventive war?

Non-proliferation today and tomorrow

Appendix Coding rules and results

1 Coding rules

A. General rules for all codings

B. Coding for references to external actors

Precisions to basic coding rules

C. Moving from the list of external actors to assessment of national identity conceptions

Tabular data

Bibliography

INTERVIEWS

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

SECONDARY AND PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES CITED

Name index

Subject index

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