Description
Are humans composed of a body and a nonmaterial mind or soul, or are we purely physical beings? Opinion is sharply divided over this issue. In this clear and concise book, Nancey Murphy argues for a physicalist account, but one that does not diminish traditional views of humans as rational, moral, and capable of relating to God. This position is motivated not only by developments in science and philosophy, but also by biblical studies and Christian theology. The reader is invited to appreciate the ways in which organisms are more than the sum of their parts. That higher human capacities such as morality, free will, and religious awareness emerge from our neurobiological complexity and develop through our relation to others, to our cultural inheritance, and, most importantly, to God. Murphy addresses the questions of human uniqueness, religious experience, and personal identity before and after bodily resurrection.
Chapter
2. History's ambiguous message
2.1 Contradictions in historical criticism
2.2 So where do we stand?
3. Ancient philosophy and early Christian thought
3.2 Early Christian responses
3.3 Medieval and Reformation developments
4. So what does the Bible say?
4.1 Old Testament scholarship
4.2 Conflicting accounts of the New Testament
5. Physicalism and theology
5.2 Christology and Trinity
5.3 Salvation and history
6. Questioning the spiritual quest
6.1 Augustinian inwardness
6.2 Contemporary revisions
2. What does science say about human nature? Physics, evolutionary biology, and neuroscience
2. The atomist revolution in physics
2.1 The medieval world-picture
2.2 The Copernican challenge
3. The Darwinian revolution
3.1 Our embarrassing relatives
3.2 Theological roots of social Darwinism
4. Neuroscience and the soul
4.1 Biology and the life principle
4.2 Neuroscience and the animal soul
4.3 Investigating the rational soul
5. Retrospect and prospect
3 Did my neurons make me do it? Reductionism, morality, and the problem of free will
2. What’s wrong with reductionism?
2.1 The pervasive influence of pictures
2.2 Defending downward causation
2.3 Further complications
3. The emergence of self-direction
3.1 Fixed patterns of complex activity
3.2 Mammalian flexibility
4. Human self-determination and responsibility
4.2 Language and the prerequisites for morality
4.3 Language and self-transcendence
5. But is this free will?
5.1 A confusion of definitions
5.2 A critique of the terms of debate
4. What are the philosophical challenges to physicalism? Human distinctiveness, divine action, and personal identity
2. The epistemological issue
2.1 On the unreliability of philosophical intuitions
2.2 Physicalism as a scientific research program
3.1 Morality versus animal altruism
3.2 Physicalism and religious experience
4. Divine action in the natural world
4.1 Why this should not be a problem
5.1 Philosophical distinctions
5.2 Theological considerations
5.4 What we know we cannot know