Chapter
IV. American influence on the soviet “transition”
2 A Regional Tradition: The Diffusion of Democratic Change under Communism and Postcommunism
Democratization and diffusion
Explaining waves of democratic change under communism and postcommunism
Wave one: the collapse of communism
Mass mobilization and electoral revolutions
Diffusion of mobilization: general patterns
Beginning the diffusion dynamic
The uneven character of diffusion
Part II Encouraging Democracy: The Role of the European Union
3 When Europeanization Meets Transformation: Lessons from the Unfinished Eastern European Revolutions
I. Introduction: understanding the gravity model
II. Democratization without decommunization: a transition model
III. Europe's impact on nation and state building
IV. Conclusion: deconstructing “smart” power
4 Democratization in Postcommunist Europe: Illiberal Regimes and the Leverage of the European Union
Divergence and convergence in the postcommunist world
International actors and democratization
Regime change in illiberal democracies
Focal Points of Cooperation
Staying the course after watershed elections
Credible Commitment to Reform
Is the european union really needed?
Part III Choosing Regime Change: Democratizing Elections
5 A Postcommunist Transition in Two Acts: The 1996–7 Antigovernment Struggle in Bulgaria as a Bridge between the 1989–92 and 1996–2007 Democratization Waves in Eastern Europe
The collapse of communism in bulgaria: unreformed communists and weak opposition
Democracy without the market: the mid-1990s economic crisis
The antigovernment campaign: from crisis to consensus
Early Popular Mobilization: The Politicization of Economic Discontent
Return to Institutional Politics: The Victory of the Right Alternative in the Presidential Elections
Collapse of the Videnov Government: Civic and Parliamentary Oppositions Unite under UDF Leadership
Defeat of the Unreformed Socialists: A New Proreform and Pro-Western Consensus
The role of regional and western actors
Conclusion: the bulgarian 1996–7 struggle in the context of the 1996–2007 democratization waves in eastern europe
6 Defining and Domesticating the Electoral Model: A Comparison of Slovakia and Serbia
Slovakia and serbia under meciar and milosevic
Why did these efforts succeed?
7 Georgia's Rose Revolution: From Regime Weakness to Regime Collapse
The vulnerability of the regime
Grasping at Straws: Divided Elites and Replacement Alliances
Precedents of Defeat: Local Elections and Opinion Polls
From vulnerability to collapse
No Rose Revolution: A Plausible Outcome
Evidence of Defeat: Exit Polls, the Parallel Vote Tabulation, and Official Results
Adjara: The Ultimate Replacement Alliance
A Winning Coalition: Unity and Division among the Elite
Broadcasting Vulnerability: The Television Media
The role of external factors
Diffusion: Assessing the “Serbia” Factor
Foreign Intervention: Assessing U.S. Influence
8 Importing Revolution: Internal and External Factors in Ukraine’s 2004 Democratic Breakthrough
I. Semiauthoritarianism as a condition permitting democratic breakthrough
II. The proximate causes of the orange revolution and external facilitators of these causes
1. Unpopular Leader and Unpopular Regime
3. Creating the Perception of a Falsified Vote
4. A Modicum of Independent Media
5. Popular Mobilization to “Protect the Vote”
6. Divisions among the “Guys with Guns”
7. Institutions and Mediation Efforts that Provided a Process for Peaceful Resolution of the Standoff
III. Long-term sources and the external facilitators of the orange revolution
1. Sources of Semiauthoritarianism
2. Stimulating the Emergence and Persistence of Civil Society
3. Economic Reform, Economic Growth, and the Rise of the Middle Class
5. The Pull of Western Institutions and Western Norms
IV. Conclusion: the limits of external actors
Part IV Resisting Reform: Backsliding Democracies and Enduring Autocracies
9 Resistance to Contagion: Sources of Authoritarian Stability in the Former Soviet Union
Three pillars of stable authoritarianism
State Control over Wealth
Organizational Power and Opposition Mobilization
Organizational power and the color revolutions
Ruling party strength and authoritarian stability: ukraine and moldova
Coercive state power and authoritarian stability: armenia, georgia, and kyrgyzstan
Coercive strength, state economic control, and autocratic stability in belarus and russia
10 Comparing Oranges and Apples: The Internal and External Dimensions of Russia’s Turn away from Democracy
I. Internal factors explaining the reverse wave in russia
1. A Semiautocratic Regime
3. A Cohesive Political Elite and a Weakened and Divided Opposition
4. Few Mechanisms of Mass Mobilization
5. State-Controlled Mass Media
6. Weak Independent Election-Monitoring Capabilities
II. External factors in explaining the reverse wave in russia
III. Can the tide be turned?
11 Contagion Deterred: Preemptive Authoritarianism in the Former Soviet Union (the Case of Belarus)
Conceptualizing and explaining preemption
The case of belarus: lukashenka's learning curve and landmarks in perfecting the policy of preemption
Cultural Preemption: The Defeat of Nationalism and the Promotion of an Incumbent-Friendly Identity
Institutional Preemption: The Legalization of Presidential Absolutism and Its Aftermath
Tactical Preemption: Decapitating the Opposition
An Early Acquaintance with Revolutionary Scenarios: Learning from Miloevis Downfall
Resisting the Orange Threat: The Tool Kit of Preemption Enhanced
Authoritarian international
12 A Horse of a Different Color: Revolution and Regression in Kyrgyzstan
All Roads Lead to Bishkek
Eliminating or Entrenching Corruption?
III. Continuities from the revolution to its aftermath: localism and clientelism
IV. The role of external factors
Epilogue: The Changing Character of the Global Struggle for Democracy
Major conclusions: the sources of regime change
Similarities and differences among the three waves
The changing nature of struggles for democracy
Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World
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