Description
Firmly rooting its argument in democratic and economic theory, the book argues that a more democratic distribution of communicative power within the public sphere and a structure that provides safeguards against abuse of media power provide two of three primary arguments for ownership dispersal. It also shows that dispersal is likely to result in more owners who will reasonably pursue socially valuable journalistic or creative objectives rather than a socially dysfunctional focus on the 'bottom line'. The middle chapters answer those agents, including the Federal Communication Commission, who favor 'deregulation' and who argue that existing or foreseeable ownership concentration is not a problem. The final chapter evaluates the constitutionality and desirability of various policy responses to concentration, including strict limits on media mergers.
Chapter
3 Quality and the Bottom Line
ADDITIONAL STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
4 Vulnerability to Outside Pressure
8 Countervailing Benefits?
2 Not a Real Problem: Many Owners, Many Sources
COMPAINE’S ANALYSIS AND THE CHICAGO SCHOOL APPROACH TO ANTITRUST
Media as a Whole Is Not the Relevant Market
Power over Price Fails as a Surrogate for Antitrust’s: Proper Socio-Political Concerns
Even This Enlarged Conception of Antitrust Is Insufficient to Account for the Fundamental Reasons (Discussed in Chapter 1) to Limit Concentration
THE FCC’S DIVERSITY INDEX
3 Not a Real Problem: The Market or the Internet Will Provide
THE MARKET CONTROLS AND PROVIDES
THE INTERNET AS A SOLUTION
DOES THE INTERNET ELIMINATE CONCERNS ABOUT CONCENTRATION?
Investment in Quality Content
Dangers of Concentrated Communicative Power
Democratic Distribution of Communicative Power
4 The First Amendment Guarantee of a Free Press: An Objection to Regulation?
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A LIMIT ON GOVERNMENT POWER: THREE PREMISES
Ultimate Beneficiary of Press Freedom
The Aims of Press Freedom
THE ULTIMATE BENEFICIARY (OR BASIS) OF PRESS FREEDOMS
UNDERMINING FIRST AMENDMENT AIMS
Aims of the Freedom of the Press Guarantee
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE PROPER LEVEL AND FORM OF SCRUTINY
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS REQUIRING LIMITS ON CONCENTRATION?
5 Solutions and Responses
FLAWED REGULATORY LIMITS ON OWNERSHIP
Limiting Reach or Audience of a Media Entity
Prohibition on a Media Firm Creating New Media Entities
2 Require Government Approval for Merger
3 Prohibit Mergers That Increase Concentration or Involve Takeover by Nonmedia Firms
5 Require Journalists' Approval for Merger
6 Tax and Subsidy Policies Encouraging Dispersal and Discouraging Concentration
7 Special Responsibilities Imposed on Large Media Firms
Postscript: Policy Opportunism
A More Democratic Distribution of Communicative Power
Risk Reduction: Avoiding Demagogic Power and Promoting the Watchdog Role
Reducing Consequences of Market Failures in Content Production and Provision
Chapter 1. Democracy at the Crossroads: Why Ownership Matters
Chapter 2. Not a Real Problem: Many Owners, Many Sources
Chapter 3. Not a Real Problem: The Market or the Internet Will Provide
Chapter 4. The First Amendment Guarantee of a Free Press: An Objection to Regulation?
Chapter 5. Solutions and Responses