Description
John R. Searle has made profoundly influential contributions to three areas of philosophy: philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of society. This volume gathers together in accessible form a selection of his essays in these areas. They range widely across social ontology, where Searle presents concise and informative statements of positions developed in more detail elsewhere; artificial intelligence and cognitive science, where Searle assesses the current state of the debate and develops his most recent thoughts; and philosophy of language, where Searle connects ideas from various strands of his work in order to develop original answers to fundamental questions. There are also explorations of the limitations of phenomenological inquiry, the mind-body problem, and the nature and future of philosophy. This rich collection from one of America's leading contemporary philosophers will be valuable for all who are interested in these central philosophical questions.
Chapter
2. The philosophy of mind and cognitive science
3. The philosophy of language
4. The philosophy of society
5. Ethics and practical reason
6. The philosophy of science
Chapter 2 Social ontology: some basic principles
I. The problem of social ontology
II. The logical structure of society
III. Further developments in the theory of social ontology
IV. How many kinds of institutional facts are there?
V. Conceptual analysis and empirical data
VI. Different kinds of “institutions”
Chapter 3 The Turing Test: fifty-five years later
I. Different ways of construing the turing test
II. From behaviorism to strong artificial intelligence
III. The refutation of strong ai and its philosophical implications
IV. Why was anyone ever a behaviorist?
V. Giving up the strong turing test
Chapter 4 Twenty-one years in the Chinese Room
Chapter 5 Is the brain a digital computer?
I. Introduction, strong ai, weak ai and cognitivism
III. The definition of computation
IV. First difficulty: syntax is not intrinsic to physics
V. Second difficulty: the homunculus fallacy is endemic to cognitivism
VI. Third difficulty: syntax has no causal powers
1. Sustained Contrast Detectors
VII. Fourth difficulty: the brain does not do information processing
VIII. Summary of the argument
Chapter 6 The phenomenological illusion
I. The current situation in philosophy
II. My experiences with phenomenology
III. The transcendental reduction, the wesenschau, and how they differ from logical analysis
IV. Some examples of the phenomenological illusion
V. A diagnosis of the phenomenological illusion
VI. Perspectivalism and relativism in heidegger
VIII. Conclusion: the role of phenomenology
Chapter 7 The self as a problem in philosophy and neurobiology
I. The philosophical problem of the self
II. The neurobiological problem of consciousness
III. The requirement of the self as a formal feature of the unified conscious field and its implications for neurobiology
Chapter 8 Why I am not a property dualist
Chapter 9 Fact and value, “is” and “ought,” and reasons for action
I. Transforming the question: from metaphysics to language to rationality
1. The metaphysical distinction between fact and value
2. The linguistic distinction between fact and value: two different kinds of utterances
3. Different kinds of reasons for action
II. Five preliminary points
1. The irrelevance of ethics
2. Observer relative and observer independent
3. Objectivity and subjectivity
4. The structure of intentionality
5. Meaning and speech acts
III. Desire-independent reasons
IV. Promising as a special case
Some mistakes about promising
Chapter 10 The unity of the proposition
Philosophy in a New Century
：Selected Essays
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