Chapter
2.1.4.1. Parties as Allocating Proposal Rights
2.1.4.2. Parties as Allocating Veto Rights
2.2. Procedural cartel theory
2.3. How does the majority cartelize the agenda?
2.3.1. The Structure of Agenda-Setting Offices
2.3.2. Who Gets the Agenda-Setting Offices?
2.3.3. Fiduciary Behavior of Officeholders
2.3.4. Loyalty from the Rank and File
2.3.5. What About Quitting the Party?
PART II NEGATIVE AGENDA POWER
3.2. Modeling the floor agenda
3.2.1. Background Assumptions
3.2.2. Voting on the Floor
3.2.3. The Cartel Agenda Model
3.2.4. The Floor Agenda Model
3.3. Proposal rights and regimes of exception
3.4. Choosing between agenda structures
4 The Primacy of Reed’s Rules in House Organization
4.2.1. Defining the Universe of Rule and Organizational Changes
4.2.2. Organizational Changes
4.2.3. The Establishment and Jurisdiction of Committees
4.2.4. Other Rule Changes
4.2.5. The Partisan Nature of Rule Changes
4.2.6. How Level Is the Playing Field?
4.2.6.1. Reed’s Revolution: Moving from a Dual Veto System to a Procedural Cartel
4.2.6.2. The Permanence of Reed’s System of Agenda Control: Dilatory Motions
4.2.6.3. The Permanence of Reed’s System of Agenda Control: The Rules Committee
4.3. Testing the primacy of reed’s rules
4.3.1. Reed’s Rules and Policy Moves “Toward the Majority”
4.3.2. Other Rule Changes and Policy Moves “Toward the Majority”
Appendix 4.a.1. procedures used in compiling the dataset
Appendix 4.a.2. list of organizational and rule changes
Appendix 4.a.3. a note on our coding of the holman rule
Appendix 4.a.4. seven rule changes that we include but that previous scholars do not
Appendix 4.b. the discharge procedure
5.2. Comparing the floor agenda and cartel agenda models: predicted rolls
5.3. A digression on the u.s. senate
5.4. Agenda control in the house: results
5.5. Comparing the floor agenda and cartel agenda models: comparative statics
5.7. Conditional versus unconditional party government
6 The Costs of Agenda Control
6.1. Moving beyond the idealized model
6.2. The costs and benefits of blocking
6.3. Inconsequential and consequential rolls
6.3.1. An Inconsequential Roll: Campaign Finance Reform Under Gingrich
6.3.2. The Number of Inconsequential and Consequential Rolls
6.3.3. Consequential Rolls on Important Enactments
6.3.4. Party Rolls and Reed’s Rules
6.4. The cost of blocking, public salience, and divided government
6.4.1. Does Divided Government Increase the Majority Roll Rate?
6.4.2. Do Opposition Presidents Produce Majority-Party Rolls?
6.4.3. Routs versus Deals
6.4.4. A Roll That Stemmed from Public Pressure Orchestrated by the President: Gramm–Latta
6.4.5. A Roll That Stemmed from Bargaining with the President: Foreign Aid for El Salvador
6.4.6. A Roll that Stemmed from Bargaining with the Senate: Expanding the Debt Ceiling
6.4.7. Routs and Deals: Summary
6.5. Rolls that occur under unified government
7 The Textbook Congress and the Committee on Rules
7.2. How should rules’ outputs change when its membership changes?
7.3. The conventional wisdom on rules from 1937 to 1960: the textbook congress
7.4.1. Party Roll Rates on Rule Adoption Votes and the Revolt Against Cannon
7.4.2. Party Roll Rates on Rule-Adoption Votes: 1937, 1961, and the 1970s
7.4.3. Party Rolls and the Location of Rules’ Median
7.4.4. Rules Committee Investigations
7.5. Pathways around the majority party?
Appendix 7.a. majority and minority rolls on rule adoption votes, by order of rules committee, majority party, and floor median ideal points, congresses 62–100a
8 The Bills Reported from Committee
8.2. Bill sponsorship and reports
8.3. Two models of how the floor agenda is set
8.3.1. A Model of Committee Decision Making
8.4.1. What Happens on the Floor?
8.4.2. Voting in Committee
8.4.3. Predictions: The Majoritarian Model
8.4.4. Predictions: The Partisan Model
8.5. Results: filing dissents with committee reports
8.5.1. Results: Linear Specification
8.5.2. Results: Quadratic Specification
8.6. Results: voting in committee to report bills
8.7. Results: the 104th and 105th congresses
9 Which Way Does Policy Move?
9.3.2. Some General Results
9.3.3. Classifying Models of the Legislative Process
9.4. Leftward ho: empirical results
9.4.1. Status Quo Policies are Mapped to the Floor Median
9.4.2. Status Quo Policies Are Mapped per Krehbiel’s Pivot Model
9.4.3. Status Quo Policies are Mapped to a “Constitutional Weighted Average”
9.5. Digression: reed’s rules redux
9.6. Discussion: how big are the policy movements?
Appendix 9.a. a stochastic spatial model
9.A.2. Sequence of Events
9.A.3. The Majority Party’s Roll Rate under the Cartel Agenda Model
Appendix 9.b. modeling the proportion of leftward proposals: three models
9.B.3. The Cartel Agenda Model
PART III THE CONSEQUENCES OF POSITIVE AGENDA POWER AND CONDITIONAL PARTY GOVERNMENT
10.1. What changes when the majority party becomes more homogeneous?
10.1.1. The Mix of Positive and Negative Agenda Powers
10.1.2. The Size of the Majority Party’s Agenda
10.1.3. The Minority Party’s Roll Rate
10.2. What does not change when the majority party becomes more homogeneous?
10.2.2. The Minimal Fiduciary Standard
10.2.3. The Majority Party’s Roll Rate
10.3. How does procedural cartel theory differ from conditional party government?
10.4. Floor voting discipline
10.4.1. How Much do Parties Influence Their Members’ Votes?
10.4.2. Buying Just Enough Votes to Win
11.1. Responsible party government
11.2. How much agenda power will a majority take?
11.3. The two types of agenda power
11.3.1. The Bedrock of Party Government: Negative Agenda Power
11.3.2. The Superstructure of Party Government: Positive Agenda Power
11.4. Agenda power and party government
11.5. Negative agenda power: consequences
A.1.2. Convergent and Divergent Validity
A.2.2.1. Theoretical Responses
A.2.2.2. Theoretical and Empirical Responses
A.2.2.3. Empirical Responses
A.2.3. Further Investigation of Roll Rates
A.2.4. Direction of Policy Movement
A.2.5. Objections to Our Measure of Policy Movements
A.2.6. Summary of External Validity
A.3. response to krehbiel
A.3.1. Krehbiel’s Critique
A.3.1.1. The Microfoundations of Krehbiel’s Model
A.3.1.2. Roll Rates as a Measure of Party Agenda Power
A.3.1.3. The Partyless Baseline?
A.3.1.4. Empirical Results
Setting the Agenda
：Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.