Cover

Half-title

Series-title

Title

Copyright

Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments

1 General Introduction

Michael Wallerstein and Modern Political Economy

Labor, Capital, and Politics

Relations between Labor and Capital

The Organization of Labor

Labor and Redistributive Politics

Labor and Social Democracy

A Seminal Contribution

Biographical Note

PART I: Class Conflict, the State, and Economic Limits to Democracy

2 Introduction

References

3 The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies

Capitalism and the Working Class

Class Compromise

Workers' Strategy

Capitalists' Strategy

Capitalists’ Best-Reply Theorem

Conditions of Class Compromise: Basic Results

Beyond Capitalist Democracy

Class Conflict and the State

Appendix

References

4 Structural Dependence of the State on Capital

The Theory Reconstructed

Assumptions

Structural Dependence without the State

Structural Dependence of the State

Is the State Structurally Dependent on Capital? Statics

Taxes on Consumption out of Income from Capital

Workers’ Welfare under Socialism and Democratic Capitalism

Caveats and Preliminary Conclusions

Is the State Structurally Dependent on Capital? Dynamics

Structural Dependence and Socialist Policies

Appendix

Preliminaries

Capitalists’ Problem

Workers’ Problem

The Government’s Problem

References

5 Capital Taxation with Open Borders

1 Introduction

2 Neutral Capital Taxation with Free Movement of Capital

3 Anticipated Tax Increases

4 Conclusion

References

PART II: The Politics of Labor Organizations

6 Introduction

References

7 Union Organization in Advanced Industrial Democracies

A Model of Collective Bargaining and Union Density

The Optimal Rate of Unionization from the Union's Perspective

Empirical Results

Dependent Variable and Sample

Independent Variables

Results

Conclusion

Appendix A: Mathematical Proofs

Appendix B: Data Sources

References

8 Centralized Bargaining and Wage Restraint

Introduction

Complements and Substitutes in Production

A Specific Model of Centralized and Decentralized Wage Setting

The Basic Model

Decentralized Wage Setting

Centralized Wage Setting

Relative Wages

Wage Setting with Wage Leadership

Conclusion

Appendix

Investment

Decentralized Wage Setting

Centralized Wage Setting

Stackelberg Leadership

References

9 Postwar Trade-Union Organization and Industrial Relations in Twelve Countries

Union Density

Union Coverage

Union Monopoly and Concentration

Authority in Unions and Employers' Organizations

Conclusion

Data Sources

Table 9.1: Net Union Density

Tables 9.2 and 9.3: Interconfederal and Intraconfederal Concentration

Tables 9.4 and 9.5: Statutory Authority in Unions and Employers’ Organizations

Figure 1: Union Coverage and Density

10 Unions in Decline? What Has Changed and Why

Introduction

Union Density and Coverage

The Centralization of Wage Setting

Union Concentration

Conclusion

Acknowledgments

References

PART III: Inequality and Redistribution

11 Introduction

12 Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies

1. Introduction

2. Measures of the Dependent and Independent Variables

2.1. Pay Inequality

2.2. Measures of Institutional Differences in Wage-Setting

2.3. Other Independent Variables

3. Statistical Procedures

4. Empirical Results

5. Change over Time

6. Discussion

7. Conclusion

Appendix: Data Sources

References

13 Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution

Basic Assumptions

Choosing the Level of Benefits with Exogenous Targeting

Choosing Both Benefit Levels and Targeting

Inequality and Welfare Spending in 18 Countries, 1980–95

Definition of Variables

Testing the Model

Conclusion

Appendix

References

14 Redistribution and Affirmative Action

1. Introduction

2. The Economy

2.1. Demographics and the Labor Market

2.2. Affirmative Action and Insurance

2.3. Labor Market Equilibrium

3. Induced Policy Preferences

4. Legislative Policy Choice

4.1. Bargaining Equilibrium

4.2. Comparative Statics

5. Discussion

Acknowledgments

Appendix

References

PART IV: Labor and the Nordic Model of Social Democracy

15 Introduction

References

16 How Social Democracy Worked: Labor-Market Institutions

I. Introduction

II. Corporatism and Competition

III. The Efficiency of Wage Equality

IV. The Maintenance of Full Employment

V. Social Democratic Decline

17 Earnings Inequality and Welfare Spending

I. Introduction

II. Theoretical Framework

III. Empirical Analysis

Description of the Data

Lagged Dependent Variable

Unemployment Rate

Share of Elderly in the Population

Turnout

Partisan Composition of Government

Methodological Issues

Results

IV. Conclusion

Appendix 1: Proofs of the Claims in the Text

Appendix 2: Data Sources

18 Social Democracy as a Development Strategy

Nordic Exceptionalism

A Simple Model of Development

The Political Feasibility of Solidaristic Bargaining

Conclusion

Appendix

References