Description
This book is an effort to consolidate several different perspectives on antitrust law. First, Professor Hylton presents a detailed description of the law as it has developed through numerous judicial opinions. Second, the author presents detailed economic critiques of the judicial opinions, drawing heavily on the literature in law and economics journals. Third, Professor Hylton integrates a jurisprudential perspective into the analysis that looks at antitrust as a vibrant field of common law. This last perspective leads the author to address issues of certainty, stability, and predictability in antitrust law, and to examine the pressures shaping its evolution. The combination of these three perspectives offers something new to every student of antitrust law. Specific topics covered include perfect competition versus monopoly, enforcement, cartels, section 1 doctrine, rule of reason, agreement, boycott, power, vertical restraints, tying and exclusive dealing, horizontal mergers, and conglomerates.
Chapter
I. SOME INTERPRETATION ISSUES
A. Conspiracy, Section 1, and Section 2
II. ENACTING THE ANTITRUST LAWS
C. What Led to the Sherman Act 1890?
D. What Led to the 1914 Legislation?
III. WHAT SHOULD ANTITRUST LAW AIM TO DO?
I. OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT THEROY
II. ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
B. Are Penalties Optimal?
E. Private Antitrust Suits
A. Optimal Penalty, Basic Result
B. Optimality of Treble Damages
II. CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM
A. Introduction to the Problem
B. Strain on the Conspiracy Doctrine
C. A Digression on the Theory of Interdependence
D. Should a Conspiracy Statute be used to Regulate Consciously Parallel Behavior?
E. Remarks on Intraenterprise Conspiracy
F. Turner on Conscious Parallelism
G. Reexamining Rahl and Turner under the Cournot and Bertrand Models
H. Posner on Conscious Parallelism
5 Development of Section 1 Doctrine
I. THE SHERMAN ACT VERSUS THE COMMON LAW
A. Aside on Ruinous Competition
B. Validity Crisis and Resolution
C. The Case Against The Common Law Standard
II. RULE OF REASON AND PER-SE RULE
6 Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule
I. THE CASE FOR PRICE FIXING
II. PER-SE AND RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS: FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Per-Se Rule and its Utilitarian Justification
B. Pressure on Rule of Reason Boundary
III. PER-SE VERSUS RULE OF REASON TESTS: UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT'S JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PER-SE RULE
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFERENCE DOCTRINE
B. Unilateral Contract Theory
II. REJECTION OF UNILATERAL CONTRACT THEORY
8 Facilitating Mechanisms
I. DATA DISSEMINATION CASES
II. BASING POINT PRICING AND RELATED PRACTICES
A. Basing Point Pricing Cases
B. A Note on the “Most Favored Customer ”Clause
III. BASING POINT PRICING: ECONOMICS
A. No Effect on Competition
B. The Klor’s Paradox and Boycott Doctrine
I. DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 2 DOCTRINE
II. LEVERAGING AND ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
A. Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases
B. The Essential Facility Doctrine
I. MEASURING MARKET POWER
II. DETERMINANTS OF MARKET POWER
III. SUBSTITUTABILITY AND THE RELEVANT MARKET: CELLOPHANE
IV. MULTIMARKET MONOPOLY AND THE RELEVANT MARKET: ALCOA
V. MEASURING POWER: GUIDELINES
I. THE SWIFT FORMULA AND MODERN DOCTRINE
II. DANGEROUS PROBABILITY REQUIREMENT
I. RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
A. Law and Justifications
II. VERTICAL NONPRICE RESTRAINTS
A. Exclusivity Agreements
B. Territorial Restrictions
III. MANUFACTURER RETAINS TITLE
B. Dr. Miles/Colgate Boundary
14 Tying and Exclusive Dealing
A. Anticompetitive Theory of Tying and Chicago School Critique
B. Anticompetitive Theory after the Chicago School
C. Efficiency and Other Considerations
III. DEVELOPMENT OF PER-SE RULE
A. International Salt and the Per-Se Rule
B. Articulation of the Per-Se Standard
C. Jerrold and the Goodwill Defense
IV. TENSION BETWEEN RULE OF REASON ARGUMENTS AND PER-SE RULE
I. REASONS FOR MERGING AND IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW
II. HORIZONTAL MERGER LAW
A. Rule of Reason and Incipiency Doctrine
B. Toward an Incipiency Doctrine: Mergers in Concentrated Markets
C. High Point of Incipiency Doctrine
D. Rejection of Incipiency Doctrine
Mergers: The Welfare Tradeoffs
16 Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate
A. Procompetitive Theories
B. Anticompetitive Theories
C. Development of Doctrine
D. Some Rule of Reason Considerations
E. Vertical Mergers and Transaction Costs
A. Potential Competition Theory
B. Subsequent Potential Competition Decisions
D. Enforcement Guidelines
17 Antitrust and the State
I. NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE
A. The Scope of Noerr Immunity in Legislative and Judicial Processes
III. SOME FINAL COMMENTS: ERROR COSTS AND IMMUNITY DOCTRINES
Antitrust Law
：Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution
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