Cover

Title

Copyright

Contents

List of contributors

Preface

Acknowledgments

1 Games and markets: economic behaviour in humans and other animals

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Evolutionary adaptation and bounded rationality: areanimals better economists than humans?

1.3 Games and Nash equilibria in economics and biology

1.4 Games in which players react to what has been donebefore

1.5 Repeated games

1.6 Markets

REFERENCES

Part I Economic behaviour in social networks

3 Cooperation and collective action in animal behaviour

Introduction

Collective action and animal behaviour

General principles

Evidence for CAPs in animal behaviour

Game theory, cooperation and collective action

Two-player game theoretic models of collective action

PrisonerÕs Dilemma

Coordination

Chicken

Beyond the two-player simultaneous game

Repeated games

Dynamic games

Incomplete information

N-player gamesFinally, models can include

N-player games

Overcoming collective action problems in animal behaviour

Asymmetric beneÞts

Coercion and private incentives

Kinship and mutualism

OstromÕs (1990) design principles

Discussion and conclusions

Future directions

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

REFERENCES

4 Conflict, reconciliation and negotiation in non-human primates: the value of long-term relationships

The despotic society model

The complexity of natural social organisation

Aggression and social harmony, a contradiction?

Social organisation: the outcome of compromising

Competition, the unavoidable consequence of socialassociation

Competition and the value of long-term relationships

Reconciliation: reducing post-conflict stress

Reduction of stress or restoration of a damagedrelationship

Involvement of third parties

Social negotiation and biological markets

The mechanisms of socio-economics: calculations oremotional rules of thumb?

Good relationships and the roots of morality

Conclusion

REFERENCES

2 Social dilemmas and human behaviour

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Social dilemmas

2.3 Variables predicted to affect the likelihood and level ofthe cooperatorsÕ dividend

The number of participants

The heterogeneity of participants

The shape of the production function and the criticalness ofindividual inputs

Security and payback mechanisms

2.4 An overview of recent experimental research on oneshotsocial dilemmas

The number of participants

The heterogeneity of participants

The shape of the production function and the criticalness ofindividual inputs

Security and payback mechanisms

Face-to-face communication

2.5 Initial conclusions

Acknowledgments

REFERENCES

Part II Biological markets

5 Biological markets: partner choice as the driving force behind the evolution of mutualisms

Choice as a selective force

Sexual selection, interspeciÞc mutualism and the evolutionof cooperation: historical developments in separate Þelds

The effect of partner choice: an example from baboons

An example of a biological market: the antÐlycaenidmutualism

Cheating and free-riding

Market value

Signals on markets

Applications of the biological market paradigm

Analogies and differences with other models of cooperation

1 Varieties of the two-player Repeated PrisonerÕs Dilemma

2 Extensions of the RPD with some form of partner choice

3 Spatial models

4 Skew models

5 Market models based on RicardoÕs law of comparativeadvantage

An example of the use of multiple paradigms

Conclusions: what is gained by a theory of markets?

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

REFERENCES

6 The utility of grooming in baboon troops

Is grooming a commodity?

Reciprocal grooming

Interchange grooming

• Tolerance at feeding/drinking sites

• Coalitionary support

• Mating opportunities

• Infant handling

Grooming and exchange in chacma baboon females

Is grooming traded for itself?

Do Ômarket forcesÕ inßuence grooming reciprocity?

Can grooming be traded for something else?

Prospects for a baboon market

Conclusions

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

REFERENCES

7 The cleaner Þsh market

Introduction

Results

Cleaning duration

Harmful bite rates

Tactile stimulation

Distribution of interactions over the day

Switching between clients

Queuing

Testing the inßuence of phylogenetic dependencies

Discussion

Methodological considerations

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

REFERENCES

8 Modelling interspeciÞc mutualisms as biological markets

Part III Mating markets

9 Human mate choice strategies

Introduction

Market value

Optimal choice strategies

Conclusions

Appendix

Acknowledgments

REFERENCES

10 How does mate choice contribute to exaggeration and diversity in sexual characters?

Introduction

Basic sexual selection model

FisherÕs runaway

Handicap models

Extreme natural selection Ð FisherÕs runaway

Extreme natural selection Ð Handicap

Multiple preferences

Discussion

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

REFERENCES

11 Information about sperm competition and the economics of sperm allocation

11.1 Introduction

11.2 Game theory models of sperm competition

11.3 Zero information

11.4 Information and the risk model

A. Loaded rafßes with perfect information

B. Asymmetric information in rafßes

C. Assessments of female risk status

11.5 Information and the intensity model

A. Instant fertilisation

B. Continuous fertilisation

11.6 Concluding remarks

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

REFERENCES

12 The economics of male mating strategies

Dispersed females

Females in groups

Male group size

Male parental investment

Conclusions

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

REFERENCES

Index