Facts, Values, and Norms :Essays toward a Morality of Consequence ( Cambridge Studies in Philosophy )

Publication subTitle :Essays toward a Morality of Consequence

Publication series :Cambridge Studies in Philosophy

Author: Peter Railton  

Publisher: Cambridge University Press‎

Publication year: 2003

E-ISBN: 9780511059087

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780521416979

Subject: B82 Ethics ( Moral Philosophy )

Keyword: 哲学、宗教

Language: ENG

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Facts, Values, and Norms

Description

In our everyday lives we struggle with the notions of why we do what we do and the need to assign values to our actions. Somehow, it seems possible through experience and life to gain knowledge and understanding of such matters. Yet once we start delving deeper into the concepts that underwrite these domains of thought and actions, we face a philosophical disappointment. In contrast to the world of facts, values and morality seem insecure, uncomfortably situated, easily influenced by illusion or ideology. How can we apply this same objectivity and accuracy to the spheres of value and morality? In the essays included in this collection, Peter Railton shows how a fairly sober, naturalistically informed view of the world might nonetheless incorporate objective values and moral knowledge. This book will be of interest to professionals and students working in philosophy and ethics.

Chapter

Generality

Humanization

Patterns of Variation

V. LIMITATIONS

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

NOTES

2 Facts and Values

I

II

Rational Determinability

Internalism

Queerness

III

Determinateness

Naturalness

NOTES

3 Noncognitivism about Rationality: Benefits, Costs, and an Alternative

I

II

NOTES

4 Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism

INTRODUCTION

THE OBJECTIVITY OF SUBJECTS

HUME’S ACCOUNT

VALUE’S INFRASTRUCTURE

THE THIRST FOR TASTE

THE COMMONALITY ASSUMPTION

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

A DIVISION OF LABOR

VALUE-BASED EXPLANATIONS

MAD (NO, ECCENTRIC) AESTHETICS AND MARTIAN AESTHETICS

AN EXAMPLE?

SOME FEATURES OF AESTHETIC VALUE, ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT ACCOUNT

MORAL VALUE

NONHYPOTHETICALNESS

CONCLUSION

NOTES

5 Red, Bitter, Good

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

NOTES

Part II Normative Moral Theory

6 Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality

INTRODUCTION

I. JOHN AND ANNE AND LISA AND HELEN

II. WHAT’S MISSING?

III. THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW

IV. THE ‘‘PARADOX OF HEDONISM’’

V. THE PLACE OF NON-ALIENATION AMONG HUMAN VALUES

VI. REDUCING ALIENATION IN MORALITY

VII. CONTRASTING APPROACHES

VIII. DEMANDS AND DISRUPTIONS

IX. ALIENATION FROM MORALITY

NOTES

7 Locke, Stock, and Peril: Natural Property Rights, Pollution, and Risk

INTRODUCTION

POLLUTION AND BOUNDARY CROSSING

DISPOSITIONAL HARMS AND RISK

COMMON PROPERTY

RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY

REVISIONIST LOCKEANISM

Self-defense

Reciprocal Risk

Acceptable Risk and Tacit Consent

Causal Proximity and Complexity

Consent, Hypothetical Consent, and Compensation

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

NOTES

8 How Thinking about Character and Utilitarianism Might Lead to Rethinking the Character of Utilitarianism

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

NOTES

9 Pluralism, Dilemma, and the Expression of Moral Conflict

INTRODUCTION

I. KANTIAN PLURALISM?

II. KANTIAN DILEMMA?

Bemis and Benchley

III. UTILITARIAN PLURALISM AND DILEMMA?

Coventry

IV. MORAL EXPRESSION

The Forum

Violin Lessons

Sartre’s Student

The Governor

Overbooking

Sophie’s Choice

Ruth’s Choice

V. CONCLUSION: THE STATUS OF MORALITY

NOTES

Part III The Authority of Ethics and Value – The Problem of Normativity

10 On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action

I. REASONING ABOUT BELIEF

II. REASONING ABOUT ACTION

III. STOCKTAKING

NOTES

11 Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, but Not Hume Versus Kant

INTRODUCTION

NORMATIVE AUTHORITY

REASON AND NORMATIVITY

NORMATIVE AUTHORITY FOR BELIEF

NORMATIVE AUTHORITY AND APPRECIATION

THE NORMATIVE AUTHORITY OF MORAL RULES

THE RULE-BREAKING CONSIDERATIONS

NOTES

12 Morality, Ideology, and Reflection; or, The Duck Sits Yet

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

NOTES

Index

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