Chapter
2 The self in philosophy, neuroscience and psychiatry: an epistemic approach
Characteristics of the perspectives
Epistemic abilities and limitations
Second-person perspective
Properties of the experiences in different perspectives
Second-person perspective
The different perspective and the theories of the self
Second-person perspective
Different notions of self
A Kantian suggestion: the self as a pure identity-pole
A hermeneutical suggestion: the self as a narrative construction
The phenomenological suggestion: the self as an experiential dimension
Two forms of self-consciousness
Nonconceptual self-consciousness
The methodological problem
The problem of temporality
The problem of intersubjectivity
4 Language and self-consciousness: modes of self-presentation in language structure
The levels of language structure and the possibilities for self-presentation
The experience of inner voice and self-awareness
Some aspects of human voice processing online
The ontogenetic basis of voice processing
The estrangement from one’s inner voice and the pathology of self-awareness
The self as a sign – the personal pronoun / and the deictic here and now
Word and entence as vehicles of consciousness and self-consciousness
The verb, its structure and meaning
Types of structure and meaning associated with the verb
The language-specific semantic roles of the self
The syntactic subcategorization frame of the verb
Every sentence is a small drama: about the representational potential of verbal mind
The basic emergent characteristics constitutive of sentence structure
Every sentence must have a self
Every sentence can have an explicit self, but no more than one, please – the complementary function of pronominals and anapho
Complex sentence structure and the case for absent nonspecular represented self
The representational potential of complex sentence and the scope of self-consciousness
Part II Cognitive and neurosciences
5 The multiplicity of consciousness and the emergence of the self
The multiplicity of consciousness
What does the unity of consciousness entail?
Single-track versus multitrack models of consciousness
Evidence for the multitrack model of consciousness
The emergence of the self
6 Asynchrony, implicational meaning and the experience of self in schizophrenia
Theoretical foundations for variation in representations, modes of processing and rates of change
Images, awareness, flow and self-representation
The theoretical foundation of asynchrononous processing of image content
7 Self-awareness, social intelligence and schizophrenia
Self-recognition research: phylogenetic and ontogenetic trends
Self-awareness and mental state attribution
Testable implications of the model
Mental state attribution in animals
Mental state attribution in children
Neurological underpinnings of self-awareness: the frontal cortex
Mental state attribution and the frontal cortex
Is self-recognition an indicator of self-awareness?
Implications of the model for schizophrenia
The role of the frontal cortex
Implications for senile dementia
8 The neural correlates of self-awareness and self-recognition
9 Autonoetic consciousness
The possible representation of consciousness in the brain
The frontal lobes as a major hub for conscious information processing
The right prefrontal cortex and consciousness
Schizophrenia, consciousness, memory and the frontal lobes
Autonoetic consciousness and autonoetic memory
10 The neural nature of the core SELF: implications for understanding schizophrenia
Neuroscepticism and the neural foundations of emotions
On the primal nature of the SELF
The essential motor underpinnings of consciousness
Resolving the Libet paradox
Neural hierarchies in the SELF-structures
Toward animal models of schizophrenia
Part III Disturbances of the self: the case of schizophrenia
11 Self and schizophrenia: a phenomenological perspective
Self and schizophrenia: early descriptive approaches
Presentation of complaints upon the initial medical contact
A case example of anomalous self-experiences in schizophrenia
Phenomenological description of self-disorders
Presence and its alterations
Sense of corporeality and its alterations
Stream of consciousness and its alterations
Self-demarcation and its alterations
Self-experience and negative symptoms
12 Self-disturbance in schizophrenia: hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection
Hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection
Artaud: interdependence of the syndromes
13 The self-experience of schizophrenics
The aim of psychopathology
Focusing the self-experience of schizophrenics
The empirical ego a the centre of self-awareness
Self-accounts illustrating disorder of ego vitality
Self-accounts illustrating disorder of ego activity
Ego consistency and coherence
Self-accounts illustrating disorders of ego consistency and coherence
Self-accounts illustrating disorders of ego demarcation
Self-accounts illustrating disorders of ego identity
The construct of ego-pathology of schizophrenics
The schizophrenic symptoms evolving from the disordered self-experience
Reactions to the threat of ego disintegration
Cognitive–affective overcompensation
The ego pathology inventory
Confirmatory factor analysis
Treatment of schizophrenics: reconstruction, resynthesis
Principles of treatment programme
APPENDIX THE EGO PATHOLOGY INVENTORY
The attributional style and paranoia
Are paranoid attributions self-protective?
The process of self-representation
The attribution–self-representation cycle
How the working self influences attributions
How attributions influence the working self
The impact of life events
Testing and developing the model
15 Schizophrenia and the narrative self
The narrative self in schizophrenia
16 Self-narrative in schizophrenia
Episodic–autobiographical memory
17 Schizophrenia as disturbance of the self-construct
Self-consciousness and potential empirical indicators
Example of ‘physical stories’ (T-S-)
Example of ‘TOM stories’ (T+S-)
Example of ‘self and other ascription stories’ (T+S+)
Example of ‘self-ascription stories’ (T-S+)
Schizophrenia as clinical disorder of self-consciousness
Future strategies in schizophrenia research
18 Action recognition in normal and schizophrenic subjects
Introduction: the sense of agency
The simulation hypothesis
Failure of the attribution mechanisms
A disturbance of executive mechanisms in schizophrenia
An experimental study of anticipation in schizophrenia
A working memory impairment?
The behavioural and clinical consequences of lack of anticipation
Dysfunction of a specific mechanism for recognizing action
A pilot study of agency in normal and schizophrenic subjects
A parametric study of agency in normal and schizophrenic subjects
Neural constraints on action recognition in the social context
Perception of biological movements
A neural hypothesis for action recognition: the ‘who’ system
19 Disorders of self-monitoring and the symptoms of schizophrenia
Auditory hallucinations and passivity symptoms in schizophrenia
Evidence for misattribution of self-generated action in schizophrenia
Thinking as a type of action
Detecting the sensory consequences of our own actions
Internal forward models of the motor system
Perception of the sensory consequences of actions in normal subjects
Behavioural evidence for problems of self-monitoring in schizophrenia
The perception of self-produced sensory stimuli in patients with auditory hallucinations and passivity
The physiological basis of the perceptual modulation of self-produced sensory stimuli
Physiological abnormalities associated with delusions of control
20 Hearing voices or hearing the self in disguise? Revealing the neural correlates of auditory hallucinations in schizophreni
21 The cognitive neuroscience of agency in schizophrenia
The psychopathology of agency in schizophrenia
The functional neuroanatomy of agency
Neuromodulation and Ichstörungen
Personal relatedness, right hemisphere and dopamine
22 Self-consciousness: an integrative approach from philosophy, psychopathology and the neurosciences
A model of consciousness and self-consciousness
Autobiographical semantic memory
Phenomenology of ego-disorders in psychosis
Self-recognition in schizophrenia
Insight in psychopathology
Is lack of insight a cognitive deficit?
The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry
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