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WHAT SHOULD CONSTITUTIONS DO?

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

CONTRIBUTORS

WHAT ARE CONSTITUTIONS, AND WHAT SHOULD (AND CAN) THEY DO?

I. INTRODUCTION

II. LAW AND THE SETTLEMENT OF MORAL CONTROVERSY

III. THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

V. JUDICIAL REVIEW

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, ORGANIC OR OTHERWISE

VII. CONCLUSION

CONSTITUTION AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW: THE LESSON OF CLASSICAL ATHENS

I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONSTITUTION AS FUNDAMENTAL LAW

II. THE ATHENIAN CRISIS OF THE LATE FIFTH CENTURY B.C.

III. THE DEEPER CAUSE OF THE CRISIS

IV. THE ATHENIAN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS

V. FUNDAMENTAL LAW, ANCIENT AND MODERN

VI. CONCLUSION

CONTRACT, COVENANT, CONSTITUTION*

I. INTRODUCTION

II. WHAT’S WRONG WITH CONTRACT?

A. It never was

B. Terms of consent

C. How stringent are the obligations established by consent?

D. Transgenerational consent

E. Interpreting obligation

III. COVENANT

A. Actuality of covenant

B. Terms of covenant

C. Stringency of covenant

D. Transgenerational covenant

E. Covenant interpretation

IV. CONSTITUTION

V. CONCLUSION

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE AGE OF TERROR

I. INTRODUCTION

II. MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM

A. Model I: Whig constitutionalism

B. Model II: Lockean and Jeffersonian constitutionalism

C. Model III: Hamiltonian constitutionalism

D. Model IV: Madisonian constitutionalism

E. Summary

III. CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES

A. Model I: Contemporary Whigs

B. Model II: Contemporary Jeffersonians

C. Model III: Contemporary Hamiltonians

D. Model IV: Contemporary Madisonians

IV. CONCLUSION

THE LIBERAL CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS*

I. INTRODUCTION

II. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A LIBERAL REPUBLIC: LIBERTY

A. What is a liberal constitution?

B. Defense of liberty

C. Promoting liberty globally

D. The defense of liberty must not be self-defeating

III. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A LIBERAL REPUBLIC: PROSPERITY

IV. FROM PRINCIPLES TO CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS: THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

A. War powers

B. The status of international law in domestic law

C. Foreign commerce

V. CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS

War Powers

Treaties and Customary Law

Economic Liberties

VI. CONCLUSION

DO CONSTITUTIONS HAVE A POINT? REFLECTIONS ON “PARCHMENT BARRIERS” AND PREAMBLES

I. INTRODUCTION: WHY WRITE DOWN CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERSTANDING?

II. THE (A)LEGAL STATUS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PREAMBLES

III. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN A CONSTITUTION’S ENDS AND CONSTITUTIONALLY AUTHORIZED MEANS

IV. THE “NONLEGAL” FUNCTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PREAMBLES: DELINEATING THE NATION

V. CONCLUSION: UNITY, MULTIPLICITY, AND PREAMBLES

THE ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY IN NEW YORK, 1621–1777*

I. INTRODUCTION

II. THE DUTCH PERIOD, 1621–1664

A. Charter of the Dutch West India Company of 1621

B. Charter of Freedoms and Exemptions of 1629

III. THE DUCAL PROPRIETARY PERIOD, 1664–1685

A. Grant of the Province of Maine of 1663/64 25

B. Grant of the Province of Maine of 1674

C. Charter of Liberties and Privileges of 1683

IV. THE ROYAL PERIOD, 1685–1776

A. Charter of Liberties and Privileges of 1691

B. Persistent threats to judicial independence

V. NEW YORK CONSTITUTION OF 1777

VI. CONCLUSION

FOOT VOTING, POLITICAL IGNORANCE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN*

I. INTRODUCTION

II. THE LOGIC OF RATIONAL POLITICAL IGNORANCE

A. Low levels of political knowledge

B. Illogical use of knowledge22

C. Information shortcuts31

III. FOOT VOTING VERSUS BALLOT BOX VOTING

A. Information acquisition

B. Information use

C. The role of interjurisdictional competition

D. Implications for group migration

E. The problem of moving costs

IV. THE POWER OF FOOT VOTING UNDER ADVERSE CONDITIONS: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE JIM CROW ERA SOUTH

A. Southern black migration during the Jim Crow era

B. Information acquisition by southern black migrants

C. Effective use of knowledge

D. Comparison with contemporary southern white ballot box voters

V. FOOT VOTING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

VII. CONCLUSION

PLURALIST CONSTITUTIONALISM

I. INTRODUCTION

II. CONSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY

III. PLURALISM AS A BASIS FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM

IV. PLURALIST CONSTITUTIONALISM

A. The minimum conditions of public order

B. Constitutionalism

V. CONCLUSION

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

II. FOUR DEMOCRATIC THEORIES

III. THE TRILEMMA OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM

IV. IDEAL THEORY AND SECOND BEST

V. REALIZING CORE PRINCIPLES

VI. SEQUENTIAL STRATEGIES

A. Convention—Deliberative Microcosm—Referendum

B. Deliberative Microcosm—Convention—Referendum

C. Other possibilities

VII. DELIBERATION DAY

VIII. CONCLUSION

THE CONSTITUTION OF NONDOMINATION*

I. INTRODUCTION

II. NONDOMINATION, DISPERSION OF ECONOMIC POWER, AND FREE ENTRY

III. MANIPULABILITY, COMPOSSIBILITY, AND DOMINATION

IV. PLURALITY OF SUPPLIERS AS A STRUCTURAL FEATURE OF A FREE MARKET

A. Misguided strategies

B. The structural argument

V. CONCLUSION

CAN WE DESIGN AN OPTIMAL CONSTITUTION? OF STRUCTURAL AMBIGUITY AND RIGHTS CLARITY*

I. INTRODUCTION

II. THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRIES

A. Human nature

B. The institutions of government

C. The protection of individual rights

III. LOCKEAN VERSUS PROGRESSIVE VISIONS

IV. THE NATURE OF MAN

V. CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS

A. Democratic elections

B. Federalism

C. Separation of powers

D. Judicial power

VI. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES

VII. CONCLUSION

INDEX