Chapter
1.2.1.2 The collision accident between trains
1.2.1.3 The rear-end accidents of trains
1.2.2 Causes of accidents and new ideas drawn from them
1.3 Present Situation of Train Operation Safety
1.3.1 Defects in the existing signal system
1.3.2 Traditional signal safety concept
1.3.3 Research progress of train operation safety
1.4 Existing Train Safety System
1.4.1 International train safety system
1.4.1.1 Japan’s high-speed train operation safety system
1.4.1.2 France’s high-speed train operation safety system
1.4.1.3 Germany’s high-speed train operation safety system
1.4.1.4 Other European countries’ high-speed train operation safety system
1.4.2 China’s train safety system
2 Existing Technology of Train Safety Control
2.1.2 Semiautomatic block
2.1.3 Automatic block between stations
2.1.4.1 Three-aspect automatic block
2.1.4.2 Four-aspect automatic block
2.1.4.3 MultiAspect Automatic Blocks
2.1.5.2 Operational principle
2.1.5.4 Examples of working mode
2.1.6.1 Concept of moving block
2.1.6.2 Operational principle and characteristics of a moving block
2.1.6.3 Difference between moving block and automatic block
2.2 Train Over-Speed Protection Technology
2.2.1 “Three big devices” on cab
2.2.1.2 Automatic train stopping (ATS)
2.2.1.3 Train radio dispatching
2.2.2 ATP train over-speed protection
2.2.2.1 Composition and structure of ATP system
2.2.2.2 Basic fundamental of train over-speed protection
2.3 Station Interlocking Technology
2.3.1 The development of interlocking technology
2.3.2 The principle and structure of interlocking system
2.3.2.1 The principle of interlocking technology
2.3.2.2 Basic content of interlocking
2.3.2.3 The device functions of interlocking
2.3.4 Computer-based interlocking
2.3.4.1 2-Vote-2 structures
2.3.4.2 3-Vote-2 structures
2.4 Centralized Traffic Control
2.4.1 Functions and roles of CTC
2.4.1.1 Command function of operation
2.4.1.2 Dispatching centralized function
2.4.2 Structure and principle of CTC
2.4.2.1 Subsystem of dispatching center
2.4.2.2 Subsystem of station
2.4.2.3 Network subsystem among stations
2.5 Centralized Signaling Monitoring Technique
2.5.1 Effects of the monitoring system
2.5.2 Characteristics of the monitoring system
2.5.3 The principle and structure of the monitoring system
3 Theory System and Framework of High-Speed Railway Train Operation Safety
3.1 System Science and Train Operation Safety
3.1.1 The concept of the system
3.1.1.1 The formation of the system concept
3.1.1.2 System definition
3.1.1.3 System characteristics
3.1.2 Overview of system science
3.1.2.1 System science of preparation and development
3.1.2.2 System science architecture
3.1.2.3 Significance and status of system science
3.1.3 The whole emergence mechanism of the system
3.1.3.1 Systematic is the basic science theory of the whole emergence
3.1.3.2 Representation of the whole emergence
3.1.3.3 Emergence of generation mechanism
3.1.4 System science in train operation safety
3.1.4.1 Train operation control system
3.1.4.2 Systems thinking in train operation safety
3.2 The Critical Control Items of Train Safety
3.2.3.1 The concept of train routes
3.2.3.2 Conflicting route
3.2.3.4 Route control process
3.2.4 Temporary speed restrictions
3.2.4.1 Concept of temporary speed restriction
3.2.4.2 Form and content of temporary speed restriction
3.2.4.3 Type and scope of temporary speed restriction
3.2.4.4 Temporary speed restriction order setting
3.2.5 The train operation status
3.3 The Architecture of the Train Safety Control System
3.4 The Key Technology of Train Safety
3.4.1 System level “fail-safe” technology
3.4.2 Parallel monitoring technology
3.4.3 The technology of data sharing and fusion
3.4.4 The technology of avoiding common cause errors
3.4.5 The monitoring and early warning and auxiliary dispatching of a train’s operation state based on big data
3.5 The Application of the System Safety Idea in the Design of a Train Control System
3.5.1 The introduction of the current situation
3.5.2 A summary of the CTCS-2I
3.5.3 Problems to be resolved in the CTCS-3 system
3.5.4.1 System components
3.5.4.2.1 Block section and balise settings
3.5.4.2.2 ATP trainborne equipment
3.5.4.3 System compatibility
3.5.5 Characteristics and advantages of CTCS-2I
4 System-Level “Fail-Safe”
4.1 Overview of System-Level “Fail-Safe”
4.1.1 “Fail-safe” concept
4.1.2 The characteristics of “fail-safe” technology in a signaling system
4.1.2.1 The traditional characteristics of signaling system “fail-safe” technology
4.1.2.2 Characteristics of “fail-safe” technology in the modern signaling system
4.1.3 Relevant standards of “fail-safe”
4.1.4 Summary of system-level “fail-safe”
4.2 Principles of System-Level “Fail-Safe”
4.2.1 General situation of system-level fault diagnosis
4.2.2 Diagnosis model of system-level fault diagnosis
4.2.2.1 Qualitative analysis method
4.2.2.2 Quantitative analysis method
4.2.3 Conditions of system-level fault diagnosis
4.3 System-Level “Fail-Safe” of Train Control System in High-Speed Railway
4.3.1 The structure and characteristics of system-level “fail-safe”
4.3.2 Sigmacompleteness inspection of train control data
4.3.3 Scene-matching detection of train operation
5.1 Summary of Parallel Monitoring Technology
5.1.1 Concept of parallel monitoring
5.1.2 Application conditions of parallel monitoring
5.2 CTC&ATP Train Tracking Interval Parallel Monitoring Based on the Theory of the Wild Geese Migration
5.2.1 Principle of existing train tracking interval control
5.2.1.1 Tracking interval model of the train in section
5.2.1.2 Factors affecting train tracking interval
5.2.2 The application of “geese migration theory” in the control of train tracking interval
5.2.3 Train tracking interval monitoring of CTC
5.2.4 The method of train tracking interval control by the CTC and ATP
5.2.4.2 Interval calculation model
5.2.4.3 The tracking interval calculation of ATP
5.2.4.4 The tracking interval calculation of the CTC
5.2.4.5 The warning output of CTC for tracking interval
5.2.5 The reliability analysis of methods for the train tracking interval control based on “geese migration theory”
5.3 Train Route Parallel Monitoring Based on Virtual Image Technique
5.3.1 Existing train route control theory and its problems
5.3.1.1 The existing methods of train route control
5.3.1.2 Problems in the process of setting train routes
5.3.1.3 The improved method for establishing a train route
5.3.2 Train route control method based on virtual image technique
5.3.2.1 The overviews of the virtual image for train route
5.3.2.2 Parallel monitoring of train routes
5.3.3 Model of train route parallel monitoring
5.4 Speed Parallel Monitoring Relying on On-Board
and Ground ATP Equipment
5.4.1 The system structure of speed parallel control relying on the on-board and ground ATP equipment
5.4.2 Synchronized processing in a parallel control system
5.4.3 Comparison strategy of train speed
5.5 TSR Parallel Monitoring
5.5.1 Working principle of TSR for existing trains
5.5.2 TSR parallel monitoring method
6 Sigmacompleteness of Train Control Data
6.1 Train Control Data and Its Sigmacompleteness
6.1.1.1 Ground equipment data
6.1.1.2 On-board equipment data
6.1.2 Sigmacompleteness of train control data
6.1.3 Train control data and train operation scenario
6.2 Formal Modeling of Fault Diagnosis Based on Data Sigmacompleteness of Train Control
6.2.1 Formal modeling and review of verification methods
6.2.1.1 An overview of formal modeling methods
6.2.1.2 Formal modeling method
6.2.1.3 Formal verification method
6.2.2 The formal modeling foundation of train control data
6.2.2.1 Formal modeling basis of the train control data
6.2.2.2 The formal model objectives of train control data
6.2.2.3 The requirement analysis of model
6.3 Fault Diagnosis Based on Sigmacompleteness of Train Control Data
6.3.1 Fault detection idea based on data completeness
6.3.1.1 The detection of train route setting errors
6.3.1.2 Device no-consistent display detection
6.3.2 Train fault warning analysis model and algorithm based on train control data completeness
6.3.2.2 Diagnostic algorithm
7 Data Sharing, Fusion, and Avoiding Common Cause Errors
7.1 The Data Sharing of Train Control Systems
7.1.1 The data sharing of a signaling system
7.1.2 The data sharing of the centralized traffic control system
7.1.3 The data sharing of monitoring data
7.2 The Fusion of Train Control Data
7.2.1 The methods of data fusion
7.2.1.1 Kalman filter method
7.2.1.2 Bayes estimation method
7.2.1.4 Data fusion based on artificial neural network
7.2.2 The fusion of train control data
7.2.2.1 Speed fusion and location fusion
7.2.2.2 The data fusion in calculating the monitoring curve
7.3 Avoid Common Cause Errors
7.3.1 The fusion process of the CTCS-3
7.3.2 Redundant structures
7.3.3 The analysis steps of common errors
8 Real-Time Monitoring and Early Warning of a Train’s Running State and Operation Behavior
8.1 Application of Big Data Theory in Monitoring and Early Warning
8.1.1 Big data of the signaling system
8.1.2 Real-time analysis method of big data
8.1.3 Data mining method based on big data
8.2 Monitoring and Early Warning of a Train’s Operation State
8.2.1 Existing train operation state monitoring and early warning
8.2.2 Monitoring of a train’s running state
8.2.3 Fault diagnosis and early warning of train running state
8.3 Operation Behavior Monitoring
8.4 Monitoring of the Signaling System and Human Factors for a Closed Loop
8.4.1 Monitoring of signaling system
8.4.1.1 The supervision of the signaling system and the equipment
8.4.1.2 The supervision of the operators
8.4.2 Monitoring of human factors for a closed loop
8.4.2.1 Human factors analysis
8.4.2.2 Monitoring of human factors
9 Train Operation Control and Intelligent Dispatching
9.1 Current State and Problems of Train Operation Control and Dispatching
9.1.1 Current state and existing problems of train operation control
9.1.2 Current state and existing problems of dispatching system
9.2 Intelligent Train Operation Control
9.3 The Train Intelligent Auxiliary Dispatching Based on Big Data
9.3.1 The integration of train dispatching and train operation control
9.3.2 The application of big data on intelligent dispatching
10 Failure Mechanism and Risk Control of a Train Control System
10.1 Failure-Causing Factors of a High-Speed Railway Signaling System
10.2 Failure Caused by Structural Problems of High-Speed Railway Signaling Systems
10.3 External Interference Leads to the Failure of High-Speed Railway Signaling Systems
10.4 Failure of the Internal Equipment Leads to the Failure of the High-Speed Railway Signaling System
10.5 Risk Control Method for Train Control System
10.5.1 Risk control and safety
10.5.2 Risk control based on parallel monitoring technology
10.5.3 Risk control based on the sigmacompleteness of the train control data
10.5.4 Risk control based on data sharing and fusion technology
11 Safety Analysis Methods for Train Control Systems
11.1 Qualitative Analysis Method
11.1.1 Safety checklist analysis
11.1.1.1 Basic meaning, purpose, and characteristics
11.1.1.2 The formation of safety checklist
11.1.2 Preliminary hazard analysis
11.1.3 Failure modes and effects analysis
11.1.4 Hazard and operability study
11.2 Quantitative Analysis Method
11.2.1 Fault tree analysis
11.2.1.1 The meaning and function of FTA
11.2.1.2 The basic structure of FTA
11.2.1.3 The procedure of FTA
11.2.1.4 Qualitative analysis in FTA
11.2.1.5 Quantitative analysis in FTA
11.2.1.6 Summary of results and application in FTA
11.2.2 Event tree analysis
11.2.2.1 The meanings and functions of ETA
11.2.2.2 The basic principles of ETA
11.2.2.3 The steps of ETA
11.2.3 The analysis method of stochastic Petri net
1 The introduction of Petri net
2 The basic concept of Petri net
4 The Markov method of SPN
5 The reliability of parallel monitoring process of train route setting system
11.3 STPA: A Safety Analysis Method
11.3.1 STAMP: An accident model based on system theory and processes
11.3.1.1 Safety constraints
11.3.1.2 The hierarchical safety control
11.3.2 STPA: STAMP-based hazard analysis
12 Safety Evaluation Methods of a Train Control System
12.1 The Purpose and Basic Principles of System Safety Evaluation
12.1.1 The purpose of system safety assessment
12.1.2 The basic principles of system safety assessment
12.2 The Implementation Phase of a System Safety Evaluation
12.2.1 Stage division and work focus
12.2.2 The corresponding relationship between test verification and design development
12.3 The Implementation of a System Safety Assessment
Safety Theory and Control Technology of High-Speed Train Operation
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