Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and Design Features ( IMF Staff Discussion Notes )

Publication series ： IMF Staff Discussion Notes

Author： Ceyla Pazarbasioglu   Ms. Jian-Ping Zhou   Vanessa Le Leslé   Michael Moore  

Publisher： INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND‎

Publication year： 2011

E-ISBN: 9781616350758

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9781462304141

Subject： F830.91 Securities Market

Keyword： Moral hazard,Banks,Bonds,Financial institutions,Financial instruments,Risk management,Financial RegulationFinancial ReformContingent CapitalToo Big To FailMoral HazardBanksBondsFinancial InstitutionsFinancial InstrumentsRisk Managementdebtcapital instrumentscapital requirementsinterestinterest ratefinancial institutionsdebt instrumentscapital marketscapital ratiosfinancial systemmoral hazardconvertible bondscrisis preventionfinancial stabilitycapital ratiocost of capitalsecuritiesequity capitalpublic sectorcapital marketprivate sectorbank capitalfinancial conditionequity ratiocapital structurecapital basecorporate governanceequity marketscentral bankliquidity crisisfinancial regulationhedgecapital positionhedge fundsmarket volatilitydividendsinterest ratesfinancial intermediationefficient marketsproperty rightssubsidiariescapital needsearly warning indicatorcapital requirementfinancial conditionscapital instrumentregulatory frameworkaccumulation of capitalfinancial oversightdiscretionary powerdebt-servicing obligationsfinancial sectorcapital gainsloss of confidencebalance sheetscapital planninginterest paymentsasset salesspeculative attackasset prices

Language： ENG

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Description

The causes of the global financial crisis were multi-faceted but revealed still unresolved weaknesses in national and international financial oversight and resolution frameworks. In particular, many governments in the crisis-hit countries had to provide unprecedented levels of support to contain the crisis and protect financial stability. These interventions have not only contributed to a significant increase in sovereign exposures but, in many countries, they have also risked weakening market discipline and worsening moral hazard.

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