An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions

Author： Nishizaki Katsuhiko

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 1434-4742

Source： Review of Economic Design, Vol.18, Iss.1, 2014-03, pp. : 73-82

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