Income-Tested Transfer Programs :The Case for and Against

Publication subTitle :The Case for and Against

Author: Garfinkel   Irwin  

Publisher: Elsevier Science‎

Publication year: 2014

E-ISBN: 9781483260495

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780122758805

Subject: C913.7 Social welfare, social relief, social security

Keyword: 社会学

Language: ENG

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Description

Income Tested Transfer Programs: The Case for and Against covers the proceedings of the 1979 conference of leading scientists, sponsored by the Institute for Research on Poverty. The contributors consider the contribution of social science knowledge and analysis in settling the arguments in the debate about the merits of income testing in transfer programs.

This text is divided into 13 chapters and begins with an overview of the history, stigmatization processes, and social cohesion of the program. The succeeding chapters define the terms “income-tested” and “non-income-tested”, as well as the historical importance of the income-testing issue. The discussion then shifts to the development of both income-tested and non-income tested programs in the United States. These topics are followed by surveys of the income support system and the issues in the income-testing debate. The remaining chapters provide evidence that most Americans have too much income testing in the overall income maintenance system. These chapters also present a reform agenda designed to reduce the role of income testing.

This book will be of value to social scientists, social welfare workers, and researchers.

Chapter

Our Current Income Support System

Our Current Income Support System

The Issues and the Papers

The Issues and the Papers

Chapter 2. Stigma in Income-Tested Programs

Chapter 2. Stigma in Income-Tested Programs

Stigmatization Processes

Stigmatization Processes

The Stigma of Poverty

The Stigma of Poverty

The Intensified Stigma of Charity

The Intensified Stigma of Charity

Responses to Stigmatization

Responses to Stigmatization

Stigma in Other Income-Tested Programs

Stigma in Other Income-Tested Programs

Conclusion: Income Testing as an Intensifier of the Poverty Stigma

Conclusion: Income Testing as an Intensifier of the Poverty Stigma

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion: Modeling the Decision to Apply for Welfare

Discussion: Modeling the Decision to Apply for Welfare

Chapter 3. Income Testing and Social Cohesion

Chapter 3. Income Testing and Social Cohesion

What Is Social Cohesion?

What Is Social Cohesion?

Argument 1: Universal Programs Are Less Likely to Reduce Social Cohesion Than Are Income-Tested Programs

Argument 1: Universal Programs Are Less Likely to Reduce Social Cohesion Than Are Income-Tested Programs

Argument 2: Universal Programs Are No Less Likely, Perhaps Even More Likely, to Reduce Social Cohesion Than Income-Tested Programs

Argument 2: Universal Programs Are No Less Likely, Perhaps Even More Likely, to Reduce Social Cohesion Than Income-Tested Programs

Conclusion

Conclusion

Discussion

Discussion

Chapter 4. Income Testing and Politics: A Theoretical Model

Chapter 4. Income Testing and Politics: A Theoretical Model

A Political Model

A Political Model

The Politics of Income Testing

The Politics of Income Testing

Conclusion

Conclusion

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Chapter 5. Social Policy Development in Europe and America: A Longer View on Selectivity and Income Testing

Chapter 5. Social Policy Development in Europe and America: A Longer View on Selectivity and Income Testing

When and Why Social Insurance Benefits and Educational Opportunities Became More Widely Extended

When and Why Social Insurance Benefits and Educational Opportunities Became More Widely Extended

Trends toward Universality of Coverage in Social Insurance and Education

Trends toward Universality of Coverage in Social Insurance and Education

Universality and Selectivity in Contemporary American Policies

Universality and Selectivity in Contemporary American Policies

Epilogue

Epilogue

Discussion

Discussion

Chapter Discussion: Ideology, Education, and Social Security

Chapter Discussion: Ideology, Education, and Social Security

6. A Simulation Analysis of the Economic Efficiency and Distributional Effects of Alternative Program Structures: The Negative Income Tax versus the Credit Income Tax

6. A Simulation Analysis of the Economic Efficiency and Distributional Effects of Alternative Program Structures: The Negative Income Tax versus the Credit Income Tax

Introduction and Major Findings

Introduction and Major Findings

Methodology

Methodology

Results from the Simulations

Results from the Simulations

Conclusion

Conclusion

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Chapter 7. Taxpayer Behavior and the Design of a Credit Income Tax

Chapter 7. Taxpayer Behavior and the Design of a Credit Income Tax

Introduction

Introduction

Antecedents of the CIT

Antecedents of the CIT

Definition of the Tax-Transfer Unit

Definition of the Tax-Transfer Unit

Accounting Period and Procedures

Accounting Period and Procedures

Definition of Taxable Income

Definition of Taxable Income

Administrative Arrangements

Administrative Arrangements

Surtax Considerations

Surtax Considerations

Categorization for Benefits

Categorization for Benefits

Costs of Administration and Compliance

Costs of Administration and Compliance

The Role of the CIT in Public Finance

The Role of the CIT in Public Finance

Political Economy and CIT Implementation

Political Economy and CIT Implementation

Appendix 7.A: Elements of Taxable Income for CIT

Appendix 7.A: Elements of Taxable Income for CIT

Appendix 7.B: CIT Administrative Design and Marginal Tax Rates

Appendix 7.B: CIT Administrative Design and Marginal Tax Rates

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Chapter 8. Income Testing and Social Welfare: An Optimal Tax-Transfer Model

Chapter 8. Income Testing and Social Welfare: An Optimal Tax-Transfer Model

The Model

The Model

Calculations

Calculations

Results

Results

Summary, Qualifications, and Policy Implications

Summary, Qualifications, and Policy Implications

Appendix: Nonfully Integrated Tax-Transfer Systems

Appendix: Nonfully Integrated Tax-Transfer Systems

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Chapter 9. Income Testing of In-Kind Transfers

Chapter 9. Income Testing of In-Kind Transfers

Introduction

Introduction

The Case for Income Testing

The Case for Income Testing

The Case for Universal Services

The Case for Universal Services

Conclusion: Income Testing as a Scarce Resource

Conclusion: Income Testing as a Scarce Resource

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Chapter 10. Financing Health Care

Chapter 10. Financing Health Care

Current Arrangements for Financing American Health Care and Their Problems

Current Arrangements for Financing American Health Care and Their Problems

Major Goals and Other Considerations of NHI

Major Goals and Other Considerations of NHI

The Universal and Income-Tested Concepts as Applied to NHI

The Universal and Income-Tested Concepts as Applied to NHI

Alternative Approaches to NHI

Alternative Approaches to NHI

Assessment of NHI Alternatives

Assessment of NHI Alternatives

Summary and Conclusions

Summary and Conclusions

Discussion

Discussion

Chapter 11. Single-Parent Households under Alternative Transfer and Tax Systems

Chapter 11. Single-Parent Households under Alternative Transfer and Tax Systems

Why Single-Parent Households Present a Special Problem for Society

Why Single-Parent Households Present a Special Problem for Society

The History of Public Policy toward Support of Children in One-Parent Households

The History of Public Policy toward Support of Children in One-Parent Households

The Distributional Consequences of the Status Quo

The Distributional Consequences of the Status Quo

The Consequences of Credit and Negative Income Tax Schemes, with Categorical Modifications for One-Parent Households

The Consequences of Credit and Negative Income Tax Schemes, with Categorical Modifications for One-Parent Households

The Remaining Dilemma and a Possible Solution

The Remaining Dilemma and a Possible Solution

Conclusion

Conclusion

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Chapter 12. Income Testing in Income Support Programs for the Aged

Chapter 12. Income Testing in Income Support Programs for the Aged

Should Social Adequacy be a Concern of OASI?

Should Social Adequacy be a Concern of OASI?

Models of the Three Systems

Models of the Three Systems

The Problem of What to Hold Constant

The Problem of What to Hold Constant

Data and Methodology

Data and Methodology

Major Results

Major Results

Some Qualifications

Some Qualifications

Isolating the Effects of the Welfare Features of OASI

Isolating the Effects of the Welfare Features of OASI

Conclusion

Conclusion

Appendix: Basic Provisions of the Supplemental Security Income Program

Appendix: Basic Provisions of the Supplemental Security Income Program

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Discussion

Chapter 13. Conclusion

Chapter 13. Conclusion

The Major Issues Reviewed

The Major Issues Reviewed

Income-Testing Particular Programs

Income-Testing Particular Programs

Implications for Policy

Implications for Policy

References

References

Author Index

Author Index

Subject Index

Subject Index

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