Inadvertent Nuclear War ：The Implications of the Changing Global Order

Publication subTitle ：The Implications of the Changing Global Order

Author： Wiberg   Hå.;Petersen   I. D.;Smoker   P.  

Publisher： Elsevier Science‎

Publication year： 2013

E-ISBN: 9781483287638

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780080413808

Subject： D815.2 the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons

Keyword： 军事理论,世界军事

Language： ENG

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Description

Since the dramatic end of the Pacific War in 1945 the threat of nuclear war has exercised the minds of many. Initial fears concerned the risk that a political crisis between the Superpowers would escalate through miltary confrontation into a 'calculated' nuclear war. Another scenario pictured a new Hitler commanding a nuclear-capable state prepared to use such weapons 'irrationally', possibly sparking a 'catalytic' nuclear war between the major Powers. More recently attention has shifted towards the risk of the 'accidental' release of nuclear weapons. While the risk of intentional conflict between the major Powers has lessened, the arsenals have only been marginally reduced, leaving the possibility of accidental release as perhaps the most threatening case. Inadvertent Nuclear War presents the risk in terms of the reliability and instability of the human and technical systems governing release, with contributions ranging from the engineering of computer software to the psychology of the chain of command. As Dr Wiberg states in his introduction, "No known technical construction, human being or social organization is absolutely failsafe."

Chapter

Front Cover

Front Cover

Inadvertent Nuclear War: The Implications of the Changing Global Order

Inadvertent Nuclear War: The Implications of the Changing Global Order

Copyright Page

Copyright Page

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Preface

Preface

About the Authors

About the Authors

PART I: Introduction

PART I: Introduction

Chapter 1. Accidental Nuclear War: The Problematique

Chapter 1. Accidental Nuclear War: The Problematique

1. Introduction

1. Introduction

2. Moral aspects: the role of probability

2. Moral aspects: the role of probability

3. Empirical aspects: what can go wrong?

3. Empirical aspects: what can go wrong?

4. Nuclear weapons and deterrence: two dilemmas and a certainty

4. Nuclear weapons and deterrence: two dilemmas and a certainty

5. In the short run

5. In the short run

Chapter 2. Accidental Nuclear War in the Context of Global Problems

Chapter 2. Accidental Nuclear War in the Context of Global Problems

PART II: The Systems and their Components

PART II: The Systems and their Components

Chapter 3. Strategic Defense and Inadvertent Nuclear War

Chapter 3. Strategic Defense and Inadvertent Nuclear War

1. The effect of Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT)

1. The effect of Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT)

2. The Strategic Defense Initiative

2. The Strategic Defense Initiative

3. The offensive potential

3. The offensive potential

4. Crisis stability

4. Crisis stability

Chapter 4. Accidental Nuclear War Considered from the Area of Reliability of Large Technological Systems

Chapter 4. Accidental Nuclear War Considered from the Area of Reliability of Large Technological Systems

1. Introduction

1. Introduction

2. Reliability

2. Reliability

3. The 'Launch on Warning' strategy

3. The 'Launch on Warning' strategy

4. 'Permissive Action Links' and the human factor

4. 'Permissive Action Links' and the human factor

5. Conclusions and proposals

5. Conclusions and proposals

Chapter 5. Computers and Accidental Nuclear Conflict

Chapter 5. Computers and Accidental Nuclear Conflict

PART III: How Humans May Err-From Private to President

PART III: How Humans May Err-From Private to President

Chapter 6. Human Reliability, Instability, and the Control of Nuclear Weapons

Chapter 6. Human Reliability, Instability, and the Control of Nuclear Weapons

1. Human reliability

1. Human reliability

2. Safety procedures: guarding against unauthorized use

2. Safety procedures: guarding against unauthorized use

3. Instability in the nuclear world of the future

3. Instability in the nuclear world of the future

4. Conclusions

4. Conclusions

Chapter 7. Why We Cannot Rely on Decision-makers in Times of Crisis

Chapter 7. Why We Cannot Rely on Decision-makers in Times of Crisis

1. Introduction

1. Introduction

2. Cognitive and emotional aspects

2. Cognitive and emotional aspects

3. Group processes

3. Group processes

4. The submarine society

4. The submarine society

5. What can be done to reduce the risk?

5. What can be done to reduce the risk?

Chapter 8. Preventing the Ultimate Disaster: Misperception at the Top

Chapter 8. Preventing the Ultimate Disaster: Misperception at the Top

1. Preventing the ultimate disaster

1. Preventing the ultimate disaster

2. Conclusion

2. Conclusion

Chapter 9. The Time Factor

Chapter 9. The Time Factor

Chapter 10. The Psychology of Risk Compensation and its Implications for Accidental Nuclear War

Chapter 10. The Psychology of Risk Compensation and its Implications for Accidental Nuclear War

1. The theory of risk compensation

1. The theory of risk compensation

2. Evidence for risk compensation

2. Evidence for risk compensation

3. Resistance to the theory of risk compensation

3. Resistance to the theory of risk compensation

4. Risk compensation and accidental nuclear war

4. Risk compensation and accidental nuclear war

5. The implications of risk compensation

5. The implications of risk compensation

6. The need for a qualitative change in risk perception

6. The need for a qualitative change in risk perception

7. A formula for constructing a new attitude

7. A formula for constructing a new attitude

8. Helping the attitude change

8. Helping the attitude change

PART IV: Organizations as Solutions and as Problems

PART IV: Organizations as Solutions and as Problems

Chapter 11. The Security Paradox and the Fear Trap

Chapter 11. The Security Paradox and the Fear Trap

1. The security paradox

1. The security paradox

2. The fear trap

2. The fear trap

3. Examples

3. Examples

4. Analysis of hypothesis

4. Analysis of hypothesis

5. Four phases of US attitudes towards the Soviet Union, 1977-84³³

5. Four phases of US attitudes towards the Soviet Union, 1977-84³³

6. Close to catastrophe

6. Close to catastrophe

7. The international tension monitor and the World Forum

7. The international tension monitor and the World Forum

Chapter 12. Nuclear Proliferation: Neither Safe nor Stable

Chapter 12. Nuclear Proliferation: Neither Safe nor Stable

1. The evolving crisis

1. The evolving crisis

2. Nuclear stability

2. Nuclear stability

3. Interacting nuclear capabilities

3. Interacting nuclear capabilities

4. Related institutional issues

4. Related institutional issues

5. Conclusion: avoid further nuclear proliferation

5. Conclusion: avoid further nuclear proliferation

PART V: What Can Be Done-and by Whom?

PART V: What Can Be Done-and by Whom?

Chapter 13. Minimizing the Risks for Accidental Nuclear War: An Agenda For Action

Chapter 13. Minimizing the Risks for Accidental Nuclear War: An Agenda For Action

1. Introduction

1. Introduction

2. Accidental nuclear war: definition and examples

2. Accidental nuclear war: definition and examples

3. The increasing probability of accidental nuclear war relative to intentional nuclear war and perhaps absolutely as well

3. The increasing probability of accidental nuclear war relative to intentional nuclear war and perhaps absolutely as well

4. Arms control initiatives, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral to reduce the chance of accidental nuclear war

4. Arms control initiatives, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral to reduce the chance of accidental nuclear war

5. Conclusion

5. Conclusion

Chapter 14. Political Aspects of Minimizing the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War

Chapter 14. Political Aspects of Minimizing the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War

Chapter 15. Counteracting Accidental Nuclear War

Chapter 15. Counteracting Accidental Nuclear War

Chapter 16. Would Actions to Survive a Nuclear Winter Help Public Opinion See the Urgency of Preventive Measures?

Chapter 16. Would Actions to Survive a Nuclear Winter Help Public Opinion See the Urgency of Preventive Measures?

1. A new situation

1. A new situation

2. Nuclear winter

2. Nuclear winter

3. Why the nuclear winter is not discussed

3. Why the nuclear winter is not discussed

4. The implications for neutral countries

4. The implications for neutral countries

5. The case of Sweden

5. The case of Sweden

6. Remember human irrationality

6. Remember human irrationality

7. What actions would make people understand?

7. What actions would make people understand?

8. Conclusions

8. Conclusions

Chapter 17. Multilateral Measures to Prevent Accidental Nuclear War and to Manage Nuclear Crisis

Chapter 17. Multilateral Measures to Prevent Accidental Nuclear War and to Manage Nuclear Crisis

1. Introduction

1. Introduction

2. Concepts and methodology

2. Concepts and methodology

3. Review of some multilateral proposals to prevent accidental nuclear war

3. Review of some multilateral proposals to prevent accidental nuclear war

4. Case study: proposal by the UN Secretary-General to establish a multilateral nuclear alert center

4. Case study: proposal by the UN Secretary-General to establish a multilateral nuclear alert center

5. Conclusions

5. Conclusions

Appendix A: The Stockholm Declaration

Appendix A: The Stockholm Declaration

Appendix B: Abbrevations

Appendix B: Abbrevations

Appendix C: Bibliography

Appendix C: Bibliography

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