Der Begriff der inneren Erfahrung bei Petrus Johannis Olivi

Author: Rode Christian  

Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing Company

E-ISSN: 1569-9684|13|1|123-141

ISSN: 1384-6663

Source: Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter, Vol.13, Iss.1, 2009-01, pp. : 123-141

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Abstract

The concept of inner experience in Peter John Olivi. This article discusses the notion of inner experience and self-knowledge in Peter John Olivi. According to Olivi, each act of cognition is accompanied by some sort of self-awareness or self-experience. Therefore, the problem of an infinite regress of acts of self-awareness arises. Olivi tries to solve this problem by drawing on a theory of reflection which bears a striking resemblance to modern self-representational or dispositional accounts of (self)consciousness. Thus, in order to be said to be »known« or »certain« it is not necessary for each single act of intellect to be followed by a higher-order act; Olivi argues that in many cases a simple first-order cognitive act suffices.