Chapter
Data Collection and Risk-Based Analysis of Airborne Aviation Safety Information
FAA Has Responded to Several Key Recommendations,
but Some Areas Remain Unaddressed
Reported Surface and Airborne Incidents Have Increased, and Several Key Factors Likely Contribute to Trends
Rate of Reported Runway Incursions Has Increased since 2004, but Serious Incidents Have Significantly Declined
Rate and Number of Reported Airborne Operational Errors Increased since 2007, Including the Most Serious Incidents
Several Key Factors Likely Contribute to Trends in Runway Incursions and Airborne Operational Errors
Enhanced Oversight and Additional Information about Incidents Could Help Improve Safety in the Terminal Area
Federal Oversight of Terminal Areas Could Be Enhanced
Runway Safety Oversight Remains Limited
Organizational Placement of Runway Safety May Limit Efforts
FAA Data for Risk Assessment May Not Be Complete, Meaningful, or Available to Decision Makers
Impact of Changes in Reporting Policies and Processes on Measures
of Incidents and Risk Is Unclear
FAA Risk-Assessment Processes Are Not Comprehensive
Key Safety Data May Not be Available to Decision Makers
Recommendations for Executive Action
Appendix I. Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Appendix II. Technologies to Improve Runway Safety
Appendix III. Technical Appendix
Evaluating the Impact of ASDE-X on Runway Incursions
Runway Incursions Rise after the Installation of ASDE-X,
but Better Reporting May Explain the Change
Aviation Safety: Status of FAA’s Actions to Oversee the Safety of Composite Airplanes
FAA Followed Its Special Conditions Process in Requiring That Boeing Demonstrate That the 787’s Composite Structures Meet Existing Safety Levels
FAA Established Special Conditions for Boeing to Demonstrate That the 787’s Composite Airframe Meets Existing Safety Levels
FAA Followed Its Processes for Developing and Monitoring Special Conditions
FAA Revised Its Fuel Tank Lightning Protection Requirements during the 787 Certification Process
FAA Granted an Equivalent Level of Safety Finding Related
to the Composite Fuselage
EASA Also Assessed the Use of Composite Materials in the Boeing 787
EASA’s Process Is Similar to FAA’s Special Conditions Process
EASA Created 11 Review Items Associated with the Boeing 787’s Composite Airframe
EASA Relied on FAA to Oversee and Determine Boeing’s Compliance in Some Areas
FAA and Industry Actions May Address Key Safety-Related Concerns, but It Is Too Early to Assess the Adequacy of These Actions
Key Safety-Related Concerns Identified in Areas Related
to Composite Airframe Repair and Maintenance
FAA Has Actions Intended to Address Key
Industry Stakeholders Play a Role in Addressing
It Is Too Early to Fully Assess the Adequacy of FAA
Agency Comments and Third-Party Views
Appendix I. Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Review of FAA’s Process to Develop Special Conditions
for the 787 Composite Structures
Review of EASA Certification Review Item Process
Identification of Repair and Maintenance Concerns
Aviation Safety:Certification and Approval Processes Are Generally Viewed as Working Well, but Better Evaluative Information Needed to Improve Efficiency
Extent of Variation in Interpretation Is Unknown but Potentially Stems from Factors Related to Performance-Based Regulations and FAA’s Processes
Extent of Variation in FAA’s Interpretation of Standards for Certification and Approval Decisions Is Unknown, but Stakeholders and Experts Indicate That Serious Problems Occur Infrequently
Industry Stakeholders Noted That Variation in Decisions Occurs as a Consequence of Performance-Based Regulations and FAA’s Exercise of Professional Judgment
Key Stakeholders and Experts Said the Certification and Approval Processes Generally Work Well, but When They Do Not, It Can Be Costly for Industry
Stakeholders and Experts Said the Certification and Approval Processes Contribute to System Safety and Work Well Most
Industry Stakeholders Said Negative Experiences
Are Infrequent but Can Cause Costly Delays
Industry Stakeholders and Experts Told Us That the Efficiency of FAA’s Processes Is Hampered by Several Shortcomings;
FAA Has Taken Some Actions to Remedy Them
FAA Has Taken Other Actions That Might Address Process Shortcomings but Lacks Performance Data to Assess the Actions’ Effectiveness
Recommendations for Executive Action
Appendix I. Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Appendix II. Summary of Responses from GAO Expert Panel