Security of United States' Nuclear Material Overseas ( Defense, Security and Strategies )

Publication series :Defense, Security and Strategies

Author: Ronald E. Allen;Nancy L. Miller  

Publisher: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.‎

Publication year: 2016

E-ISBN: 9781624170393

Subject: E9 Military Technology

Keyword: 军事技术,军事理论

Language: ENG

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Security of United States' Nuclear Material Overseas

Chapter

BACKGROUND

DOE, NRC, AND STATE ARE NOT ABLE TO FULLY ACCOUNT FOR U.S. NUCLEAR MATERIAL LOCATED AT FOREIGN FACILITIES

U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements Generally Require That Partners Report Inventory Information upon Request, but DOE and NRC Have Not Systematically Sought Such Data

DOE and NRC Do Not Have a Current Comprehensive Inventory of U.S. Material Overseas

NMMSS Does Not Contain Data Necessary to Identify Where U.S. Material Is Located Overseas

DOE, NRC, and State Have Not Pursued Annual Reconciliations of Inventories of Nuclear Material Subject to U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Terms with All Partners

No U.S. Law or Policy Directs U.S. Agencies to Obtain Information Regarding the Location and Disposition of U.S. Nuclear Material at Foreign Facilities

DOE, NRC, AND STATE DO NOT HAVE ACCESS RIGHTS TO MONITOR AND EVALUATE THAT U.S. NUCLEAR MATERIAL LOCATED AT FOREIGN FACILITIES IS ADEQUATELY PROTECTED

U.S. Agencies’ Ability to Evaluate the Security of U.S. Nuclear Material Overseas Is Limited by Lack of Access Rights, and the United States Relies on Partners to Maintain Adequate Security

U.S. Agencies Have Visited Foreign Sites to Monitor and Evaluate the Physical Security of U.S. Nuclear Material

U.S. Agencies Do Not Have a Formal Process for Coordinating and Prioritizing U.S. Physical Protection Visits

DOE and U.S. Agencies Do Not Systematically Visit Countries with Category I U.S. Nuclear Material or Revisit Foreign Facilities Not Meeting Security Guidelines

U.S. Physical Protection Teams Have Not Systematically Visited Countries Holding Category I Quantities of Nuclear Material

U.S. Teams Have Not Revisited Facilities That Did Not Meet IAEA Security Guidelines in a Timely Manner

DOE SEEKS TO INCREASE SECURITY OR REMOVE VULNERABLE U.S. NUCLEAR MATERIAL AT PARTNER FACILITIES BUT FACES CHALLENGES

CONCLUSION

MATTERS FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

APPENDIX I: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

APPENDIX II: CURRENT AND PREVIOUS U.S. NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT PARTNERS

APPENDIX III: INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR THE CATEGORIZATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

End Notes

End Note for Appendix I

End notes for Appendix II

Chapter 2: NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES: A PRIMER

SUMMARY

WHAT IS A “SECTION 123” AGREEMENT?

Requirements Under the Atomic Energy Act

Exempted vs. Non-exempted Agreements

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

EXPORT LICENSING

SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS

Examples of Subsequent Arrangements

U.S.-Japan Agreement

U.S.-India Agreement

Iran-Related Restrictions

TERMINATION OF COOPERATION

LEGISLATION IN THE 112TH CONGRESS

S. 109

H.R. 1280

H.R. 1280, Amended

The Administration’s Response

H.R. 1320

FY2012 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 112-87)

H.R. 1905 and H.R. 2105

S. 1048

End Notes

INDEX

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