Description
This 1987 book looks at competition, attacking the notion that competition always leads to good results and that more competition is better. It also attacks the notion that cooperation is always harmful. An efficient economic equilibrium requires an optimal combination of both cooperation and rivalry. Telser first examines the genesis of certain late nineteenth-century laws that affected competition in the United States. Going on to give theoretical insights into cooperation and rivalry, he shows when unrestricted competition can lead to an efficient equilibrium, as well as when restrictions on competition can provide for the same. The tensions between these two forces are especially pertinent to the study of innovation - the more costly it is to protect the property rights of ideas, the greater is the reliance on secrecy, and hence, the more likely is the wasteful duplication of results.
Chapter
4 State of the U.S. economy during the last third of the nineteenth century
Chapter 3 Competition, cooperation, and efficiency
2 Competition in pure exchange
3 Description of the example
4 Analysis of competition for the example
Chapter 4 Stable coalitions
Part 1 Stable coalitions whose returns are convex functions
2 Definitions and basic properties
4 Properties of the imputations for a superadditive strictly convex function
6 Application to semiprivate goods
Part 2 Stable coalitions whose returns are concave functions
2 Some facts about concave characteristic functions
3 Status of the core for concave /
4 Status of the core for plants of optimal size
Part 3 Stable coalitions for private and semiprivate goods
3 The invisible-hand theorem
4 Relations between the neoclassical and core theories
Chapter 5 Equilibrium with decreasing average cost: an application of the theory of the core illustrated by production and exchange among spatially separated markets
2 Description of the economic model
3 The linear programming problem
6 An algorithm for finding the optimal assignment
7 Some numerical examples for illustrating the theoretical results
8 Prices paid and prices received
10 Appendix: multiproduct plants
Chapter 6 A theory of self-enforcing agreements
2 Long-term versus short-term contracts
3 A principal-agent problem: Prizzi's honor
4 Research and development: a free-loader problem
Chapter 7 Some new results on duopoly applied to theories of Cournot, Bertrand, and Edgeworth
2 Assumptions of the model
3 Noncooperative equilibria under Assumption 2, Bertrand-Edgeworth
4 Noncooperative equilibria under Assumption 1, Cournot
5 Additional tests of the rival theories
Chapter 8 Rivalry by means of innovation
Part 1 Some empirical results
2 Innovation when research results are private
3 Some empirical results relating merger intensities to growth rates, 1895-1930, and merger rates to measures of innovation, 1951-9
4 Empirical evidence from cross sections of manufacturing industries over time, 1947-72
Part 2 A theory of innovation and its effects
2 Optimal sequential research from a known distribution
3 N Simultaneous independent research programs
A Theory of Efficient Cooperation and Competition
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