Budgetary Decisions ：A Public Choice Approach

Publication subTitle ：A Public Choice Approach

Author： Dirk-Jan Kraan; Gordon Tullock  

Publisher： Cambridge University Press‎

Publication year： 1996

E-ISBN: 9780511881008

P-ISBN(Paperback): 9780521418713

Subject： F810.3 State budget and final accounts

Keyword： 财政、国家财政

Language： ENG

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Budgetary Decisions

Description

This book provides an introduction to the positive theory of the budgetary process based on the theory of public choice. Although budgetary institutions are very diverse, both between and within countries, it is possible to identify key elements which are common to all forms of representative government. The author identifies these key elements as the supply of services by public agencies; demand for services by political bodies (cabinet, houses of parliament, etc); negotiations between administrators of agencies and political bodies in an 'internal market'; and decision-making in the form of budgetary and substantive legislation. The book develops a step-by-step model which incorporates all these elements, a model which can be used to explain and predict budgetary decisions in existing institutions, as well as to analyze institutional change, including cost budgeting and various forms of privatization.

Chapter

Cover

Half-title

Title

Copyright

Contents

Foreword

Preface

1 Introduction

Perspectives on budgetary decision-making

What kind of public choice theory?

Design of the volume

Guide to the literature

2 The structure of the budgetary process

Demand and supply in the public sector

Budgetary decisions

Budgetary decisions as transactions in internal markets

The competence rules of the budgetary process

The procedural rules of the budgetary process

Guide to the literature

3 Demand in the public sector

Public and private goods

Objectives of politicians

A partial approach to the public demand for public goods

A general approach to the public demand for public goods

Public demand for private and group goods

Guide to the literature

4 Supply in the public sector

The economic theory of bureaucracy

The structure of the internal market

Objectives of bureaucrats

A partial approach to the public supply of public goods

A general approach to the public supply of public goods

The public supply of private and group goods

Guide to the literature

5 Political decision-making

Elements of game theory

Domination and Pareto superiority in budgetary games

Presolutions

Some game-theoretical results

Guide to the literature

6 Bureaucratic decision-making

The extended budgetary game

A partial approach to bureaucratic decision-making about public goods

A general approach to bureaucratic decision-making about public goods

Bureaucratic decision-making about private and group goods

Guide to the literature

7 Institutions

Agenda rules

The modelling of agenda rules

The germaneness rule

The rule of non-intervention

Guide to the literature

8 Ways to reform

The deficiencies of the budget mechanism

Financial management

Privatization

The public choice perspective reconsidered

Guide to the literature

Mathematical appendix

Numerical example for model I

Numerical example for model II

The unimodal Preference Function

Numerical example for model IV

List of symbols

Glossary

Notes

References

Index

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