Cover

Title

Copyright

Dedication

Contents

Acknowledgments

1 Introduction

1 .1 COMMITMENT, VALUE, AND MORAL REALISM

1.1.1 The hypothesis

1.1.2 Moral realism defined

1.2 WHY COMMITMENT?

1.3 COMMITMENT AND ITS FEATURES

2 The challengers: Allan Gibbard and Richard Rorty

2.1 INTRODUCTION

2.1.1 Eugene V.Debs

2.1.2 Irony, norm-expressivism, and the possibility of commitment

2.2 ALLAN GIBBARD S NORM-EXPRESSIVISM

2.2.1 Introduction

2.2.2 Norm acceptance and commitment

2.2.3 Commitment, self-understanding, and identity

2.2.4 Problems of method

2.2.5 Error theories and self-transparency

2.2.6 Normative objectivity

2.2.7 Parochialism

2.2.8 Relativism and the 'fact of commitment"

2.2.9 Conclusion

2.3 RICHARD RORTY: CONTINGENCY, IRONY,AND SOLIDARITY?

2.3.1 Introduction

2.3.2 Rorty's antirealism

2.3.3 Irony or solidarity

2.3.4 Conclusion

2.4 IRREALISM IN CONTEXT

2.4.1 Debs's final vocabulary: a realist account

2.4.2 Commitment without objective value: the case of Meursault

2.5 RORTY AND GIBBARDI CONCLUSION

3 Commitment and intention

3.1 INTRODUCTION

3.2 COMMITMENT AS A KIND OF INTENTION

3.2.1 Commitment and intention: differences

3.2.2 Commitment and personal policies: the reduction

3.3 COMMITMENT VERSUS POLICIES

3.3.1 Defeasibility

3.3.2 Flexibility

3.3.3 A closer look

3.3.4 Commitment revision

3.4 CONCLUSION

4 Commitment and belief

4.1BELIEF CONSTRAINTS

4.1.1 Introduction

4.1.2 The cognitive component of commitment

4.1.3 Beliefs: The functionalist approach

4.1.4 The intention model

4.1.5 Alfred Mele on intention and belief

4.1.6 Commitment and confidence conditions

4.1.7 Confidence conditions and belief constraints

4.1.8 Conclusion

4.2 VALUES AND SELF-CONCEPTION

4.2.1 Introduction

4.2.2 Personal and impersonal value

4.2.3 Care, value, and commitment

4.2.4 Personal value and the intention-like commitments

4.2.5 Self-conception: a first step

4.3 OBJECTIVE BELIEFS AND INTENTION-LIKE COMMITMENTS

4.3.1 Introduction

4.3.2 Filtering, stability, and self-understanding

4.3.3 Filtering

4.3.4 Stability and self-understanding

4.3.5 Conclusion

5 Self-conception and substantive commitments

5.1 DAVID VELLEMAN ON SELF-CONCEPTION

5.1.1 Introduction

5.1.2 Intrinsic-desire view of self-conception

5.1.3 Criticisms: the cognitive model of self-conception defended

5.1.4 Internal criticisms

5.1.5 External criticisms: redefining the terms of the debate

5.1.6 Interpretation and action

5.1.7 Scientific models of explanation in action theory: limitations

5.1.8 Interpretation, explanation, and the Indispensability Thesis

5.2 CONCLUSION: REALIST BELIEFS AND SUBSTANTIVECOMMITMENTS

5.2.1 Summary:putting the pieces together

5.2.2 Self-understanding, identity, and narrativity

5.2.3 Identity, self-understanding, and stability

6 Conclusion

6.1 RORTY AND GIBBARD REVISITED

6.1.1 Richard Rorty

6.1.2 Allan Gibbard

6.1.3 Simon Blackburn and quasi-realism

6.2 REVIEW AND PROJECTION

Bibliography

Index