Cover

Title

Copyright

Dedication

Contents

Introduction

1 The Problem of Consciousness

I. What Is Consciousness?

II. What Are the Relations Between Consciousness and the Brain?

III. Some Features of Consciousness

Subjectivity

Unity

Intentionality

The Distinction Between the Center and the Periphery of Consciousness

The Gestalt Structure of Conscious Experience

The Aspect of Familiarity

Mood

Boundary Conditions

IV. Some Common Mistakes About Consciousness

References

2 How to Study Consciousness Scientifically

1. Introduction

2. Thesis 1

Answer to Thesis 1

3. Thesis 2

Answer to Thesis 2

4. Thesis 3

Answer to Thesis 3

5. Thesis 4

Answer to Thesis 4

6. Thesis 5

Answer to Thesis 5

7. Thesis 6

Answer to Thesis 6

8. Thesis 7

Answer to Thesis 7

9. Thesis 8

Answer to Thesis 8

10. Thesis 9

Answer to Thesis 9

11. Conclusion

References

3 Consciousness

Resistance to the Problem

Consciousness as a Biological Problem

Identifying the Target: The Definition of Consciousness

The Essential Feature of Consciousness: The Combination of Qualitativeness, Subjectivity, and Unity

Qualitativeness

Subjectivity

Unity

Some Other Features

Feature 2: Intentionality

Feature 3: The Distinction Between the Center and the Periphery of Attention

Feature 4: All Human Conscious Experiences Are in Some Mood or Other

Feature 5: All Conscious States Come to Us in the Pleasure/Unpleasure Dimension

Feature 6: Gestalt Structure

Feature 7: Familiarity

The Traditional Mind-Body Problem and How to Avoid It

How Did We Get into This Mess? A Historical Digression

Summary of the Argument to This Point

The Scientific Study of Consciousness

The Standard Approach to Consciousness:The Building Block Model

Blindsight

Binocular Rivalry and Gestalt Switching

The Neural Correlates of Vision

Doubts About the Building Block Theory

Basal Consciousness and a Unified Field Theory

Variations on the Unified Field Theory

Conclusion

Literature Cited

4 Animal Minds

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

5 Intentionality and Its Place in Nature

I

2

3

4

5

References

6 Collective Intentions and Actions

1 The Intuition

Thesis 1

Thesis 2

Constraint 1

Constraint 2

Thesis 3

2 The Notation

3 The Presupposition

Thesis 4

Thesis 5

References

7 The Explanation of Cognition

The Problem

Marr’s Version of the Information-Processing Model

Following a Rule

Some Preliminary Distinctions

Deep Unconscious Rule-Following

Conclusion

References

8 Intentionalistic Explanations in the Social Sciences

I

II

Conclusion

References

9 Individual Intentionality and Social Phenomena in the Theory of Speech Acts

1. Meaning as Individual Intentionality

2. Meaning as a Social Phenomenon

Conventions

Rules

Shared Human Background Abilities

3. Conclusion

References

10 How Performatives Work

1. What Exactly Is a Performative?

2. What Exactly Is the Problem About Performatives?

3. Condition of Adequacy

4. Previous Analyses

5. Performatives As Assertives

6. Performatives as Declarations

7. Performatives and Literal Meaning

8. Summary and Conclusion

References

11 Conversation

I

II

III

12 Analytic Philosophy and Mental Phenomena

1. Introduction: The Behaviorist Background

2. Carburetor Functionalism

3. Turing Machine or Organizational Functionalism:Putnam and Dennett

4. Diagnosis and Conclusion

References

13 Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person

I

II

III

IV

V

14 Skepticism About Rules and Intentionality

Name Index

Subject Index