Chapter
Preface and Acknowledgments
1 Introduction and Synthesis
1 The Principles and Practice of Sustainable Economic Development: Overview and Synthesis
1.2 Resource Management and Sustainable Development
1.3 Institutions, Governance, and Political Economy
1.4 The Nature, Causes, and Consequences of Agricultural Development Policy
1.5 Development, Vulnerability, and Poverty Reduction
2 Reflections on the Foundations of Development Policy Analysis
2.1.1 The Four Stages of Research in Development Economics
2.1.2 The Nature-Causes-Consequences Paradigm for Development Policy Analysis
2.2 Behavioral Foundations for Agricultural Development Policy
2.2.1 Toward Fundamental Explanations of Farm-Household Behavior
2.2.2 Modern Trends in Empirical Analysis
2.3 Organizational Foundations for Development Policy Analysis: The New Institutional Economics
2.3.1 Examples of Nonfundamental Explanations
2.3.2 From the Coase Theorem to Fundamental Explanations of Agrarian Contracts
2.3.3 Assumptions, Levels of Analysis, and Categorical Versus Noncategorical Theories
2.3.4 Toward a Unified Version of the New Institutional Economics
2.3.5 More on Big Versus Small Farms
2.3.6 The Economics of the Third-Best: A Constitutional Approach to Governing Rent-Seeking
2.4 Modern Theories of Market and Institutional Failure: Shocks, Traps, Nets, and Ladders
2.5 The Anatomy of Specialization
2.6.1 Prohibition of Alcohol and Drugs
2.6.2 Illegal Immigration
2.6.3 Abortion and Prostitution
2.6.4 Bans and Subsidies: Parastatals, Renewable Energy, and Sustainability
2.6.5 The Role of the Economist
2 Resources, Environment, and Sustainable Development
3 Scarcity, Security, and Sustainable Development
3.2 Scarcity and Security
3.3 Sustainable Development: What Is It Anyway?
3.4 Trilogies, Triads, and Triangles
3.4.1 Positive Sustainability and the Three Pillars
3.4.1.1 A systems approach
3.4.1.2 Dynamic efficiency
3.4.1.3 Intertemporal equity
3.4.2 Public Policy: Prosustainability or Not?
3.5 Research Opportunities
3.6 Thoughts on Economic Diplomacy and Education
Maximizing Intertemporal Welfare
A.1. The case with discounting
A.2. The case with no discounting: ρ=0
4 The Economics of Fossil Fuels and Pollution
4.2 The Framework with Nonrenewable Resource and a Ceiling on the Stock of Pollution
4.2.1 Abatement of Pollution
4.2.2 Nonstationary Demand
4.3 Ceiling with Fossil Fuels with Different Pollution Intensities
5 Integrated Groundwater Resource Management
5.1 Groundwater Management: From Sustainable Yield to Dynamic Optimization
5.2 Optimal Management of a Single Groundwater Aquifer
5.2.1 Transitional Dynamics
5.2.2 The Pearce Equation and Pricing for Optimal Extraction
5.3 Extensions and Exceptions to the Pearce Equation
5.3.1 Pearce Equation for Multiple Water Resources
5.3.2 Pricing and Finance of Watershed Services
5.3.3 Measuring Natural Capital
5.3.4 Pearce Equation with Endogenous Governance
5.4 Open Access and the Gisser–SÁnchez Effect
5.5 Policy Implications and Directions for Further Research
6 Optimal Joint Management of Interdependent Resources: Groundwater Versus Kiawe (Prosopis pallida)
6.2 Groundwater–Kiawe Management Framework
6.2.1 Groundwater Dynamics
6.2.4 The Optimal Steady State
6.3 An Application to the Kona Coast of Hawai’i
6.3.2 Groundwater Extraction and Desalination Costs
6.3.4 Groundwater Uptake by Kiawe
6.3.5 Kiawe Removal Costs
7 Win–Win Solutions for Reforestation and Maize Farming: A Case Study of Nan, Thailand
7.2 Maize Farming in Nan Province
7.3 Value of Community Forest Products
7.4 Farmers’ Incentive to Convert Forest to Maize Farm
7.4.1 Perfect Foresight View
7.4.2.2 Financial constraints
7.5 Limitations of Current Government Policies
7.6 Alternative Win–Win Policies
3 Institutions, Governance, and Political Economy
8 The Role of Institutions in Natural Resource Use
8.2 Institution, Resource Use, and Resource Scarcity: Debates in the Literature
8.2.1 Game Theory Studies on Common Property Resource Management
8.2.2 Effects of Trade on Resource Use in a Resource-Abundant Economy
8.3 Optimal Institutions Given the Cost of Institutional Change
8.3.1 Steady State Analysis
8.3.2 Institutional Change on the Transition Path
8.4 Institutional Choice in Equilibrium
8.5 Research Opportunities on Resource Governance
8.5.1 Transitions Across Different Forms of Institutions
8.5.2 General Equilibrium Effects
8.5.3 The Role of Government and Its Interaction with Resource Users
8.5.4 Institutions and Economic Development
9 Public Choice and the Generalized Resource Curse
9.3 Mechanisms by Which Abundance Can Become a Curse
9.3.1 Crowding Out Manufacturing
9.3.2 Political Economy Curses: Distortionary Tariffs and the Transmission Effect
9.4 Modeling the Curse of Abundance
9.4.1 The Three-Sector Australian Model
9.4.1.1 Crowding out of manufactured importables
9.4.1.2 Distortionary tariff after the boom
9.4.2 The Augmented Dutch Disease: The Four-Sector Model
9.4.2.1 Crowding out of manufactured exportables
9.4.2.2 Distortionary tariff and the distribution of gains and losses
9.5 Rent-Seeking Effects on Public Policies
9.5.1 Modeling Rent-Seeking and the Political Economy Effects of the Boom
9.5.2 Learning by Lobbying
9.6 All That Curses Is Not Gold: Implication for the Philippines
10 Governing Commercial Agriculture in Africa: The Challenges of Coordinating Investments and Selecting Investors
10.2 Capturing the Productivity Growth Potential Through Commercial Agriculture
10.2.1 Small Versus Large Farms?
10.2.2 The Challenges of Governing Large-Scale Commercial Farming
10.3 Coordinating Investments and Selecting Investors for Better Governance of Commercial Agriculture
10.3.1 Coordinating Investments and Selecting Investors for “Value” Discovery
10.3.2 Institutional Arrangements for Public and Private Coordination
10.3.3 Presidential Investor Advisory Councils
10.3.4 Industry-level Public–Private DIALOGUE and Coordination
10.3.5 Coordinating Public–Private Investments Within Spatial Development Plans
10.4 Coordinating with Communities and Local Stakeholders in Governing Commercial Agriculture
10.5 Governance Beyond Governments
10.5.1 Voluntary Industry Standards
10.5.2 Civil Society Organizations and Standards for Transparency and Good Governance
10.5.3 International Development Institutions
11 Land Confiscations and Land Reform in Natural-Order States
11.2 Confiscations in Early Modern Europe and Its Offshoots
11.2.1 Confiscations of Church Lands by Established Governments
11.2.1.1 Henry VIII’s monastic confiscations
11.2.1.2 Joseph II’s monastic confiscations
11.2.2 Confiscation of Lands by Revolutionary Parliaments
11.2.2.1 The interregnum confiscations in Great Britain
11.2.2.2 The loyalist confiscations in North America
11.2.2.3 Confiscations during the early French revolution
11.2.2.4 Confiscations by ruling chiefs in Hawai’i
11.3 Origins of Early Modern Confiscations
11.4 Redistribution and Sale of Confiscated Lands
12 Regional Integration and Illicit Economy in Fragile Nations: Perspectives from Afghanistan and Myanmar
12.1 Economic Framework for Illicit Activities and Its Cross-Border Context
12.4 A Way Forward for Policy Analysis
Appendix: Notes on Harmful Drugs
13 Corruption, Transactions Costs, and Network Relationships: Governance Challenges for Thailand
13.2 The Setting: Political and Administrative Reforms and the Asian Economic Crisis
13.3 Network Relationships, Transactions Costs, and Corruption
13.3.1 Connected Dealings: Cases from Thailand
13.4 Reducing Connected Dealings and Improving Procurement in Thailand
13.4.1 Improving the Legal Infrastructure
13.4.2 Targeting Corruption-Friendly Economic Policies
13.4.3 Upgrading of the Database
13.4.4 Increased Social Mobilization for Enhanced Transparency
4 The Nature, Causes, and Consequences of Agricultural Development Policy
14 The Role of Agricultural Economists in Sustaining Bad Programs
15 Agricultural R&D Policy and Long-Run Food Security
15.2 Returns to Agricultural R&D
15.3 A New World Order for Agricultural R&D Spending
15.4 Prices and Productivity: Longer Term Patterns and Prospects
15.5 Implications of Alternative Productivity Paths for the World’s Poor
15.6 Implications of Alternative Productivity Paths: Quantitative Illustration
16 Energy and Agriculture: Evolving Dynamics and Future Implications
16.2 Key Linkages Between Energy and Agriculture
16.3 Key Examples of Energy–Agriculture Linkages
16.3.1 Energy and Agriculture Linkages in the Case of Groundwater
16.3.2 Energy and Agriculture Linkages in the Case of Fertilizer
16.3.3 Energy and Agriculture Linkages in the Case of Biofuels
16.4 Empirical Illustrations of Energy–Agriculture Linkages
16.4.2 Linkages Between Energy, Fertilizers, and Agriculture
16.4.2.1 Long-term trends of fertilizer and fossil fuel prices
16.4.2.2 Impact of fertilizer prices on cereal production
16.5 Policy Implications of Food–Energy Interactions
Technical Annex A: Derivations of Conceptual Models
17 Trends and Fluctuations in Agricultural Price Distortions
17.2 Indicators of National Distortions to Agricultural Prices
17.3 National Distortions to Farmer Incentives: Trends Since the Mid-1950s
17.4 Government Responses to Fluctuations and Spikes in International Food Prices
17.5 Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
18 Getting the Price of Thai Rice Right: Episode II
18.2.1 International Rice Markets
18.2.2 Precursor of the PMS
18.2.3 Overview of the PMS
18.2.4 Analysis of the PMS
18.3 Price Elasticity of Demand for the Export of Thai Rice
18.4.1 Increased Famers’ Income
18.4.2 Increased World Price of Rice
18.4.3 Stabilized Farm Gate Price
18.5 Challenges to the PMS
18.5.2 Internal Factors: Corruption and Inefficiency
18.6 Negative Outcomes of the PMS
18.6.1 Losses from Selling Rice Below Cost
18.6.2 Depletion of Rice Diversity
18.6.3 Erosion of Traditional Market Mechanisms
18.6.4 Loss of Exporter Leadership
18.8 Policy Recommendations
18.8.1 An Exit Strategy for the PMS
18.8.2 Regional Rice Market Arrangement
19 Philippine Rice Self-Sufficiency Program: Pitfalls and Remedies
19.1 Rice Self-Sufficiency and Food Security
19.2 Why Countries Pursue Self-Sufficiency in Rice
19.2.1 Rice Price Volatility
19.2.3 Export Restrictions
19.3 Philippine Rice Self-Sufficiency Plan
19.4 Pitfalls of the Program
19.4.1 Likelihood of Success
19.4.3 High Cost of the Program
20 Production Specialization and Market Participation of Smallholder Agricultural Households in Developing Countries
20.3 Conceptual Framework and Empirical Model
20.4 Data and Description of Production and Marketing Environment
5 Development, Vulnerability, and Poverty Reduction
21 Deviant Behavior: A Century of Philippine Industrialization
21.2 The Philippines and the Competition: Catching Up Since 1870
21.2.1 The Industrial Output Data
21.2.2 Regional Growth Rates: When and Where Did Industrial Growth Begin?
21.2.3 When Did Rapid Industrial Growth Become Widespread?
21.3 Unconditional Industrial Convergence
21.3.1 Unconditional Convergence
21.3.2 Was There Persistence?
21.4 Understanding the Philippines’ Deviant Behavior
21.4.1 Institutions: Political Instability and Threatened Property Rights?
21.4.2 Trade Liberalization?
21.4.3 Real Currency Overvaluation?
21.4.4 Overseas Labor Migration?
21.4.5 Real Exchange Rate and Trade Regime Interactions?
21.5 Deviant Behavior and Path Dependence
22 Bundling Drought Tolerance and Index Insurance to Reduce Rural Household Vulnerability to Drought
22.2 Drought Risk, Vulnerability, and Development Interventions
22.3 DT and Drought II: Prospects and Complementarity
22.3.3 The DT–Drought II Complementarity
22.4 Calibrating and Evaluating a DT–II Bundle for Maize in Ecuador
23 Have Natural Disasters Become Deadlier?
23.3.1 Frequency and Deadliness of Natural Disasters
23.3.2 Recent Patterns in Natural Disasters
23.3.3 Determinants of Disasters and Their Deadliness
23.4.1 Catastrophic Risks, Insurance, and Reconstruction
23.4.1.1 Strategic considerations and priorities in disaster risk prevention and mitigation
Reliability of Data on Natural Disasters
24 The Growth–Poverty Nexus: Multidimensional Poverty in the Philippines
24.3 Household Data and Deprivation Dimensions
24.4 What Has Been Happening to Poverty in Recent Years?
24.5 Poverty Profile from the Lens of MPI
25 Poverty Reduction and the Composition of Growth in the Mekong Economies
25.4 The Growth–Poverty Nexus
25.4.1 Conceptual Background
25.4.2 Poverty and Aggregate Growth
25.4.3 Poverty and Sectoral Growth
25.5.1 Poverty and Aggregate Growth
25.5.2 Poverty and Sectoral Growth
A. Decomposing Changes in Poverty Incidence
B. Poverty and Aggregate Growth
C. Poverty and Sectoral Growth
Sustainable Economic Development
：Resources, Environment, and Institutions
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