Chapter
Embassy Security Construction
Temporary U.S. Personnel and/or Citizen Evacuation
Changing the Status of a Foreign Post
Accountability Review Boards
The Attack in Benghazi, Libya,
Embassy Security and the Benghazi Attack70
Accountability Review Board in the Wake of the Benghazi Attack
Department of State Actions in Response to the Benghazi Attack
Funding Data and Recent-Year Funding Observations
Funding Issues for Congress
Chapter 2: Diplomatic and Embassy Security Funding Before and After the Benghazi Attacks(
Background on State Department’s Budget
and Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding
Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding Data
Administration Requests, House-Proposed,
Senate-Proposed, and Enacted Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding
Security Funding for the Benghazi Facility
Appendix. State Department Funds for
Diplomatic/Embassy Security, FY2008-FY2015
Chapter 3: Diplomatic Security: Overseas Facilities May Face Greater Risks Due to Gaps in Security-Related Activities, Standards, and Policies*
Attacks against U.S. Diplomatic Missions Resulted in Legal and Policy Changes
State Bureaus and Offices Responsible for Physical Security of U.S. Diplomatic Facilities Abroad, Numbers of Facilities, and Funding for Physical Security of Facilities
State Conducts a Range of Activities to
Manage Risks to Overseas Facilities; However, Gaps Exist in Categorizing Facilities and Ensuring Data Reliability
State Manages Risk to Overseas Facilities through Several Activities and Has Recently Taken Steps to Improve These Activities
OBO Tracks Overseas Facilities in a Property Inventory Database
DS Assesses Threat Levels at Posts Overseas
A DS-Led Interagency Board Establishes Physical Security Standards for Diplomatic Work Facilities
DS and the OIG Periodically Assess Facility Vulnerabilities
DS Assesses and Ranks Facilities According to Levels of Risk to Help OBO Set Construction Priorities
State Has Taken Several Actions to Enhance Its Risk Management Activities since the September 2012 Attacks
Problems with Categorizing Facilities and Ensuring Data Reliability May Impact State’s Tracking and Ranking of Facilities
DS and OBO Do Not Have a Shared Understanding on When to Categorize Warehouses as Office Facilities
State Lacks Standard Terminology for Different Facility Categories
OBO’s Property Inventory Database and DS’s Risk Matrix Have Data Reliability Problems
State Has Established Physical Security Standards for Most Types of Facilities, but Several Lack Standards, and Some Standards
Although State Has Developed Security Standards for Most Types of Facilities, It Lacks OSPB Standards for Several Others
State’s Process for Updating Its Physical Security Standards Is Not Always Timely
Inconsistencies within Security-Related Guidance Documents May Lead to Confusion and Inconsistent Application of Some Security Standards
State Does Not Systematically Reassess Standards against Evolving Threats and Risks
State Mitigates Vulnerabilities for
Work Facilities That Do Not Meet Security Standards, but Its Waivers and Exceptions Process Has Weaknesses
When Facilities Do Not Meet Standards, State Mitigates Security Vulnerabilities through Various Construction Programs and Its Waivers and Exceptions Process
OBO and DS Address Some Security Vulnerabilities through Construction Programs
When Security Vulnerabilities Are Identified, a Post Must Obtain Waivers or Exceptions That Define Agreed-Upon Mitigation Steps
Many Overseas Work Facilities Do Not Meet the Most Rigorous Security Standards Set for Newly Constructed or Newly Acquired Facilities
Waivers and Exceptions Are Not Systematically Tracked, Requested, or Reviewed, and Requests Are Not Always Timely, Correct, or Fully Implemented
DS Does Not Systematically Track or Re-evaluate Waivers and Exceptions
DS Does Not Systematically Request Waivers and Exceptions
Certain Waivers and Exceptions Were Not Requested in a Timely Manner, Contained Inaccuracies, or Were Not Fully Implemented
State Follows Some Risk Management Principles but Lacks an Adequate Risk Management Policy for the Physical Security of Work Facilities
DS Established Principles for a Risk Management Policy,
but the Policy Has Not been Fully Developed or Implemented
State’s Risk Management Activities Do Not Operate as a Continuous Process and Do Not Continually Incorporate New Information
State’s Ongoing Risk Management Activities Do Not Operate as a Continuous Process to Incorporate Relevant Data
State’s Risk Management Activities Lack a Feedback Loop that Continually Incorporates New Information
Recommendations for Executive Action
Appendix I. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Diplomatic Security Abroad: Background and Selected Analyses
( Defense, Security and Strategies )
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