African Gnosis: Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge

E-ISSN： 1555-2462|28|2-3|149-233

ISSN： 0002-0206

Source： African Studies Review, Vol.28, Iss.2-3, 1985-09, pp. : 149-233

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Abstract

This article is extracted from a larger essay which grew as a consequence (or, more exactly, as an accident) of an invitation to establish a survey on African philosophy. Strictly speaking, the notion of African philosophy refers to contributions of Africans practicing philosophy within the definite framework of the discipline and its historical tradition (Horton, 1976; Hountondji, 1977; Mudimbe, 1983b). It is only metaphorically or, at best, from a historicist perspective, that one would extend the notion to African traditional systems of thought, considering them as dynamic processes of integrating concrete experiences into the order of concepts and discourses (Ladrière, 1979: 14-15). Thus, I have preferred to title this text “African Gnosis.” J. Fabian used the notion of gnosis (1969) in his analysis of a charismatic African movement. In this contribution, the wider frame of this notion seems better to encompass the range of problems addressed, all of which are based on a preliminary question: to what extent can one speak of an “African knowledge,” and in which sense? Etymologicaly, gnosis is related to gnosko, which in ancient Greek means “to know.” It refers to a structured, common, and conventional knowledge, but strictly under the control of specific procedures for its use as well as transmission. Gnosis is, consequently, different from doxa, or opinion, and, on the other hand, cannot be confused with episteme, or general intellectual configuration.