Gödel's Program Revisited Part I: The Turn to Phenomenology

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

E-ISSN: 1943-5894|12|4|529-590

ISSN: 1079-8986

Source: Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Vol.12, Iss.4, 2006-12, pp. : 529-590

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Abstract

Convinced that the classically undecidable problems of mathematics possess determinate truth values, Gödel issued a programmatic call to search for new axioms for their solution. The platonism underlying his belief in the determinateness of those questions in combination with his conception of intuition as a kind of perception have struck many of his readers as highly problematic. Following Gödel's own suggestion, this article explores ideas from phenomenology to specify a meaning for his mathematical realism that allows for a defensible epistemology.