Respecting Persons, Respecting Preferences

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

E-ISSN: 1741-6183|19|1|21-46

ISSN: 0953-8208

Source: Utilitas, Vol.19, Iss.1, 2007-03, pp. : 21-46

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Abstract

In this article, I argue that the state has a prima facie obligation to help its citizens satisfy their autonomous preferences. I argue that this obligation is grounded in the state's obligation to respect its citizens as persons, and that part of what is involved in respecting someone as a person is helping her satisfy her autonomous preferences. I argue that that which makes preferences autonomous is also that which makes them, and not their non-autonomous counterparts, worthy of respect. In addition, I reject other views of what makes preferences worthy of respect, in particular Ronald Dworkin's view that only preferences for one's own enjoyment of some goods or opportunities deserve political consideration. Finally, I consider the state's obligation towards immoral autonomous preferences, and I argue that the state's prima facie obligation to promote the satisfaction of autonomous preferences is quite strong.