Intertemporal bargaining predicts moral behavior, even in anonymous, one-shot economic games ¹

E-ISSN： 1469-1825|36|1|78-79

ISSN： 0140-525x

Source： Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol.36, Iss.1, 2013-02, pp. : 78-79

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