Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy

Publisher： Cambridge University Press

E-ISSN： 1537-5943|83|3|965-978

ISSN： 0003-0554

Source： American Political Science Review, Vol.83, Iss.3, 1989-09, pp. : 965-978

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