Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data

Publisher： Cambridge University Press

E-ISSN： 1537-5943|94|3|595-609

ISSN： 0003-0554

Source： American Political Science Review, Vol.94, Iss.3, 2000-09, pp. : 595-609

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