Publisher： Cambridge University Press
E-ISSN： 1750-0117|10|3|299-315
ISSN： 1742-3600
Source： Episteme, Vol.10, Iss.3, 2013-08, pp. : 299-315
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.
Abstract
In their most recent co-authored work, Conee and Feldman (2008) suggest that epistemic support should be understood in terms of best explanations. Although this suggestion is plausible, Conee and Feldman admit that they have not provided the necessary details for a complete account of epistemic support. This article offers an explanationist account of epistemic support of the kind that Conee and Feldman suggest. It is argued that this account of epistemic support yields the intuitively correct results in a wide variety of cases. Further, this explanationist account of epistemic support is not susceptible to objections that Lehrer (1974) and Goldman (2011) have raised for similar accounts of epistemic support.
Related content
Religious Studies, Vol. 46, Iss. 1, 2010-03 ,pp. :
Access to resources
Recommend
Evidentialism and the problem of stored beliefs
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 145, Iss. 2, 2009-08 ,pp. :
Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement
Episteme, Vol. 6, Iss. 3, 2009-10 ,pp. :
The Nature of Rational Intuitions and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection
Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 74, Iss. 1, 2007-06 ,pp. :