Publisher： Cambridge University Press
E-ISSN： 1750-0117|12|2|241-247
ISSN： 1742-3600
Source： Episteme, Vol.12, Iss.2, 2015-05, pp. : 241-247
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Abstract
Hilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought not to be regarded as being of central importance in epistemology. I reply by conceding that reasons may not be necessary for knowledge, in at least some cases, but I argue that they are nevertheless vitally important in epistemology more broadly. Their importance stems from being necessary, not for knowledge but for us, given that we are social agents with practical concerns. In that sense, we have (social and practical) reasons for (having a practice of giving and receiving epistemic) reasons.
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