Chapter
PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR
SMUGGLING AND
TERRORIST TRAVEL:
U.S.-FOREIGN PARTNERSHIP
EFFORTS
PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR
SMUGGLING AND
TERRORIST TRAVEL:
U.S.-FOREIGN PARTNERSHIP
EFFORTS
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Chapter 1:
COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING:
MEGAPORTS INITIATIVE FACES FUNDING
AND SUSTAINABILITY CHALLENGES
NNSA PLANS TO COMPLETE 45MEGAPORTS, BUT
FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION IS UNCERTAIN BECAUSE OF
ADMINISTRATION-PROPOSED BUDGET CUTS
NNSA Plans to Complete 45 Megaports and Has Spent about
$850 Million
Status of the Megaports Initiative
The Megaports Initiative Has Implemented a Training and Sustainability
Program and Developed New Technology
Megaports Initiative Expenditures
Partner Countries’ Cost-Sharing Contributions
Due to Proposed Budget Cuts, NNSA Plans to Shift the
Initiative’s Focus to Sustainment Rather than ExpansionDue to Proposed Budget Cuts, NNSA Plans to Shift the
Initiative’s Focus to Sustainment Rather than Expansion
Interagency Group Has Been Established to Review Megaports
Initiative’s Future Role
COUNTRIES CITE BENEFITS OF THE MEGAPORTS
INITIATIVE, BUT SEVERAL FACTORS LIMIT
ITS EFFECTIVENESS
Benefits of the Megaports Initiative Cited by Partner Countries
Several Factors Have Impeded the Initiative’s Effectiveness
Some Partner Countries Not Fully Using Radiation Detection Equipment
Some Megaports Partner Countries Not Fully Participating in the
Initiative
Management Weaknesses Impede the Initiative’s Effectiveness
NNSA Has Not Finalized a Long-Term Plan for Ensuring the Initiative’s
Sustainability
Performance Measures Are Not Sufficient
Limited Testing and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment
Limited Coordination between Megaports and CSI
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION
APPENDIX I: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
APPENDIX II. RADIATION DETECTION EQUIPMENT USED
BY THE MEGAPORTS INITIATIVE
APPENDIX III: INFORMATION ABOUT NNSAMEGAPORTS
APPENDIX IV: LIST OF OPERATIONAL MEGAPORTS AND
MEGAPORTS BEING IMPLEMENTED
APPENDIX V:MEGAPORTS INITIATIVE’S TOTAL BUDGET
AND EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEARS 2003 THROUGH 2012
Chapter 2:
COMBATING TERRORISM:
ADDITIONAL STEPS NEEDED
TO ENHANCE FOREIGN PARTNERS’
CAPACITY TO PREVENT
TERRORIST TRAVEL
U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSESSMENTS HAVE IDENTIFIED
FOUR KEY GAPS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES’ CAPACITY TO
PREVENT TERRORIST TRAVEL OVERSEAS
U.S. AGENCIES CONDUCT FOREIGN CAPACITY-BUILDING
EFFORTS RELATED TO THREE OF THE FOUR KEY GAPS,
BUT COORDINATION COULD BE IMPROVED
U.S. Foreign Capacity-Building Efforts Address Sharing
Information about Known and Suspected Terrorists
Several U.S. Foreign Capacity-Building Efforts Address the Use
of Fraudulent Travel Documents but Some Efforts Lack
Coordination
Multiple Agencies Fund and Implement Training Courses in Fraudulent
Travel Document Recognition
Agencies Funding and Implementing Fraudulent Travel Document
Training Sometimes Lack Coordination
Agencies Also Address the Use of Fraudulent Travel Documents through
Capacity-Building Efforts Related to Lost and Stolen Passports
State and USAID Undertake Efforts to Improve Foreign
Governments’ Passport Issuance Security
The U.S. Government Has Anticorruption Efforts Overseas
although Not Specifically Aimed at Passport Issuance and
Immigration Agencies
NO PERFORMANCE MEASURES TO GAUGE
GOVERNMENTWIDE PROGRESS IN CLOSING KEY GAPS IN
FOREIGN PARTNERS’ ABILITY TO PREVENT TERRORIST
TRAVEL HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED
Performance Measures Are Key Tools for Decision
Makers but U.S. National Counterterrorism Strategies
Lack Governmentwide Performance Measures Related to
Foreign Capacity Building to Prevent Terrorist Travel
Individual Agency Strategies Do Not Contain Performance
Measures Related to Foreign Capacity Building to Prevent
Terrorist Travel Abroad, but Some Agency Components Track
Efforts Related to One Key Gap
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION
APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
APPENDIX II: U.S. CAPACITY-BUILDING EFFORTS
RELATED TO THE VULNERABILITIES OF AVIATION AND
BORDER SECURITY
Prevention of Nuclear Smuggling and Terrorist Travel: U.S.-Foreign Partnership Efforts
( Defense, Security and Strategies )
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