Chapter
IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION LESSONS, POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE
IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION LESSONS, POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE
Chapter 1 LEARNING FROM IRAQ: A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION*
1. OVERSIGHT IN A WAR ZONE
Other SIGIR Oversight Work
WHAT HAPPENED AND TO WHAT EFFECT
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki
Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs Hussain al-Shahristani
Speaker ofthe Council of Representatives Osama al-Nujaifi
Minister of Finance Rafi al-Eissawi
Minister of Justice Hassan al-Shimari
Acting Minister of Interior Adnan alAsadi
Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud
President of the Board of Supreme Audit and Acting Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq Dr. Abdul Basit Turki al-Sae’ed
Former Prime Minister Dr. Ayad Allawi
Former Prime Minister of Iraq Dr. Ibrahim al-Ja’afari
Former Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Ahmed Chalabi
Former Minister of Housing, Interior, and Finance Baqir Jabr al-Zubeidi
Former Minister of Interior Jawad alBolani
Former Commissioner of Integrity Judge Raheem al-Ugaili
Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
Deputy Secretary of State William Burns
Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides
USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah
Former under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and member of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan Dr. Dov Zakheim
Lieutenant General Thomas Bostick
Lieutenant General Robert Caslen
Ambassador Christopher Hill
Senior Deputy Assistant USAID Administrator Christopher Crowley
USAID Mission Director Thomas Staal
Senator John McCain III (R-Arizona)
Senator Susan Collins (R-Maine)
Senator Claire McCaskill (D-Missouri)
Representative Howard “Buck” McKeon (R-California)
Representative Adam Smith (D-Washington)
Representative Stephen Lynch (D-Massachusetts)
Representative Michael McCaul (R-Texas)
Representative Peter Welch (D-Vermont)
Representative Jason Chaffetz (R-Utah)
Former Representative Christopher Shays (R-Connecticut)
Former Representative Bill Delahunt (D-Massachusetts)
Former Representative Jim Marshall (D-Georgia)
NATION (RE)BUILDING BY ADHOCRACY
ORHA—Initiating the Program (January 2003–April 2003)
Coalition Provisional Authority—Re-initiating the Program (April 2003–June 2004)
Attempting Iraq’s Recovery
U.S. Embassy—Re-evaluating the Program (June 2004–June 2005)
U.S. Mission-Iraq—Executing the Program Amid Growing and Then Descending Violence (June 2005–August 2010)
Reaching out to the Provinces
U.S. Embassy—Transitioning to Traditional Assistance (August 2010–October 2012)
Department of Defense Programs
Security Assistance Through the FMS Program
U.S. Agency for International Development Programs
Department of State Programs
Other Civilian Agency Programs
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
Iraq Security Forces Fund
Commander’s Emergency Response Program
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs
Smaller U.S. Funding Streams
Other Assistance Programs
You Break It, You Own It?
Defining and Redefining: Moving Goals and Benchmarks
Obligations and Expenditures: An Incomplete Story
Transportation and Communications
MOD Equipment and Transportation
MOI Equipment, Infrastructure, and Sustainment
Democracy and Civil Society
Constitution and Elections
Local and Provincial Programs
Civic Cleanup and Infrastructure Repairs
Private-sector Development
State-owned Enterprise Reform
Promoting Private Business
Institutional and Regulatory Reform
Responding to Deficiencies
Two Steps Forward and One Step Back: State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
Revolution at the Pentagon: Defense Directive 3000.05
Reaching for More Reform: NSPD 44
Authority Is Not Action: RSCMA and Dual Key Approaches
Reform but Not Integration: State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
Advantages of an Integrated SRO Management Office
A Solution on the Table: The Elements of an Effective SRO Reform Bill
Clarifying USOCO’s Operational Space
Defining USOCO Leadership and Reporting Requirements
Consolidating SRO Structures under USOCO
Institutionalizing Oversight: Special Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations
1. Create an Integrated Civilian-Military Office to Plan, Execute, and Be Accountable for Contingency Rebuilding Activities during Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations
2. Begin Rebuilding Only after Establishing Sufficient Security, and Focus First on Small Programs and Projects
3. Ensure Full Host-Country Engagement in Program and Project Selection, Securing Commitments to Share Costs (Possibly through Loans) and Agreements to Sustain Completed Projects after Their Transfer
4. Establish Uniform Contracting, Personnel, and Information Management Systems That All SRO Participants Use
5. Require Robust Oversight of SRO Activities from the Operation’s Inception
6. Preserve and Refine Programs Developed in Iraq, Like the Commander’s Emergency Response Program and the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program, That Produced Successes When Used Judiciously
7. Plan in Advance, Plan Comprehensively and in an Integrated Fashion, and Have Backup Plans Ready to Go
APPENDIX A: A BILL TO ESTABLISH THE UNITED STATES OFFICE FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Chapter 2 IRAQ: POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS*
OVERVIEW OF THE POST-SADDAM POLITICAL TRANSITION
Initial Transition and Construction of the Political System
Interim Government Formed and New Coalitions Take Shape
December 15, 2005, Elections
2006-2011: SECTARIAN CONFLICT AND U.S.-ASSISTED RECONCILIATION
Benchmarks and a Troop Surge
Iraqi Governance During the Troop Surge: 2008-2009
Empowering Local Governance: Provincial Powers Law and January 31, 2009, Provincial Elections
Outcomes: Maliki Strongest among Shiites, and Sunni Tribalists Enter Politics
THE MARCH 7, 2010, ELECTIONS: SHIITES FRACTURE AND SUNNIS COHERE
Election Law Dispute and Final Provisions
Flashpoint: De-Baathification and Disqualification of Some Prominent Sunnis
Agreement on a New Government Reached (“Irbil Agreement”)
2010-2014 Government Formed10
POST-U.S. WITHDRAWAL POLITICAL UNRAVELING
Disputes over Maliki’s Attempts to Monopolize Power
Political Crisis Begins Immediately after U.S. Withdrawal Completion
Mid-2012: The Crisis Produces Failed Attempt to Vote out Maliki
Crisis Intensifies as 2013 Begins, Triggered by Move against Another Key Sunni
The Crisis and Upcoming Elections
April 2013 Provincial Elections
District and Sub-District Elections
Constitutional Amendments
Broader Sunni Community Grievances and Escalating Violence
Sunni Insurgent Violence/Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) and Naqshabandis
KRG-Central Government Disputes17
Territorial Issues/“Disputed Internal Boundaries”
Attempts to Resolve or Mitigate the Dispute
The Sadr Faction’s Continuing Ambition and Agitation
GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
National Oil Laws and Other Pending Laws
Energy Sector Development
General Human Rights Issues
Use of Coercive Force against Arab Spring-Related Demonstrations
Media and Free Expression
Religious Freedom/Situation of the Christian Religious Minority
Specific Funding for Religious Minorities in Iraq
Iranian Opposition: People’s Mojahedin/Camp Ashraf and PJAK
U.S. MILITARY WITHDRAWAL AND POST-2011 POLICY
Question of Whether U.S. Forces Would Remain Beyond 2011
President Obama Announces Decision on Full Withdrawal
Structure of the Post-Troop Relationship
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I)
Police Development Program
Late 2012: Iraq Rededicating to U.S. Security Programs?
Regional Reinforcement Capability
The Diplomatic and Economic Relationship
The State Department as Lead Agency
Iraq: Reconstruction Lessons, Politics and Governance
( Politics and Economics of the Middle East )
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