Chapter
A. Shadow Banks and Financial Intermediation
B. Regulation of Shadow Banking
1. Restrictions on Bank Activities
2. Growth of off-Balance
Sheet Activities
3. Varying Forms of Prudential Supervision
C. The Shadow Banking System’s Fragility
2. Reliance on Short-Term
Funding Markets
3. Lack of Explicit Government Support
III. SELECTED COMPONENTS OF THE SHADOW
BANKING SYSTEM
1. Unsecured Commercial Paper and Asset-Backed Commercial Paper
4. Auction Rate Securities
B. Institutions and Entities
5. Asset-Backed
Commercial Paper Conduits
6. Government-Sponsored Enterprises
7. Other Financial Guarantors
IV. THE CRISIS IN THE SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM
A. Episode I: The Liquidity Crisis of 2007
1. Failure of Mortgage Lenders
3. The Panic and the Run on Commercial Paper
4. The Government Response
B. Episode II: Growing Anxiety and the Run on Bear Stearns
2. Run on AuctionRateSecurities
3. Bear Stearns and the Run on Repo and Other Collateral
4. The Falloutfrom Bear and the Government Response
C. Episode III: The Panic of 2008
2. The Government Response
D. Credit Market Impacts of the Financial Turmoil
Chapter 2:
TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER,
SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY. HEARING ON
"THE SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM"
THE EMERGENCE OF THE PARALLEL BANKING SYSTEM
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Chapter 3:
TESTIMONY OF HENRY M. PAULSON, JR.,
FORMER SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY. HEARING ON
"THE SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM"
MONEY MARKET MUTUAL FUNDS
Chapter 4:
STATEMENT OF PAUL A. MCCULLEY,
MANAGING DIRECTOR, PIMCO.
HEARING ON
"THE SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM"
THE SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM AND
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Chapter 5:
COMMENTS ON “REGULATING THE
SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM” BY DANIEL K.
TARULLO, MEMBER, BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM