Chapter
Key Provisions of the CTBT
International Efforts on Behalf of Entry into Force
Budget of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission
The National Academy of Sciences Study and Its Critics
Appendix. Chronology, 1992-2009
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments(
Can the United States Maintain Deterrence
Can the United States Maintain the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise
Can the United States Maintain Existing Warheads without Testing?
Does Deterrence Require New Warheads That Must Be Tested?
Do U.S. Warheads Require New Surety Features? Is Nuclear Testing Needed to Add Them?
Does the Treaty Provide Adequate Protection
What Does the Treaty Ban?
How Capable Is the CTBT Monitoring Regime?
Monitoring Systems and Methods
Detection of Radioactive Gases
Detection of Radioactive Particles
Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar (InSAR)
Detecting Collateral Evidence
On-Site Inspections (OSIs): Procedural Aspects
Additional Evasion Scenarios
Testing Without Attribution
Would Clandestine Testing Confer Military Advantages?
What Risks Does a Nation Run if It Is Caught Cheating?
The CTBT, Nuclear Nonproliferation,
The Treaty’s Technical Contributions to Nonproliferation
“Nuclear Umbrella,” New Weapons, and Nonproliferation
The CTBT and the NPT’s “Grand Bargain”
The CTBT and Nuclear Disarmament
Moratorium and Entry into Force
Conclusion: Alternatives, Packages,
Appendix A. History of Nuclear Testing, Test Bans, and Nonproliferation
Appendix B. Abbreviations
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty: Updated “Safeguards”
History of the Safeguards
Deconstructing the Safeguards
Reconstructing the Safeguards
Implementing the Safeguards
Has Past Implementation Been Adequate?
Would Revised Safeguards Be Effectively Implemented?
Issues for Implementation
Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear Nonproliferation, CTBT Ratification, and Revised Safeguards
Appendix A. Development of the Safeguards58
Conduct of Underground Nuclear Testing or Stockpile Stewardship
Maintenance of Laboratories and “Human Scientific Resources”
Maintenance of Capability to Resume Nuclear Tests Prohibited by Treaties
Conduct of R&D to Improve Treaty Monitoring Capability
Development of Intelligence Programs to Monitor Nuclear Programs of Other Nations
Procedures for Withdrawing from CTBT to Conduct Nuclear Testing
Appendix B. Recommendations by General John Shalikashvili (USA, ret.), 200159
Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation, and the Test Ban Treaty
Monitoring, Verification, and Foreign Nuclear Programs
Stewardship of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile
Minimizing Uncertainty with a Treaty of Indefinite Duration
Appendix C. Letter and Memorandum from
Senators Kyl, Domenici, and Sessions, 200860
Recommendations by the Congressional
Commission on the Strategic Posture
of the United States,200961
Recommendations on the Nuclear
Recommendations on the Nuclear
Recommendations on the Comprehensive Test