Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma—The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play

Author： Lindgren Kristian   Verendel Vilhelm  

Publisher： MDPI

E-ISSN： 2073-4336|4|1|1-20

ISSN： 2073-4336

Source： Games, Vol.4, Iss.1, 2013-01, pp. : 1-20

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